INTEREST

Vol. 1, No. 2

CONTENTS

Page

IN OUR TRADITION
Neil J. O'Connell, O.F.M..... 3

EVALUATIVE COGNITION
Martin de Porres Keely, O.F.M..... 4

AN APPROACH TO THINGS
Noel A. Fitzpatrick, O.F.M..... 8

THE OXFORD MOVEMENT AND THE ANGLICAN ANOMALY
Conrad L. Harkins, O.F.M..... 14

ST. LAWRENCE OF BRINDISI: *Doctor Ecclesiae*
Blaine Burkey, O.F.M.Cap..... 20

CASE IN POINT: THE DIVINE OFFICE
Philip J. Martin, O.F.M..... 23

BOOK REVIEWS 25

EDITORIAL STAFF
Celestine L. Leary, O.F.M. (Editor)
Noel A. Fitzpatrick, O.F.M.
Victor F. Guarino, O.F.M.
Robert R. Monahan, O.F.M.

PUBLICATION-ART
Francis X. Miles, O.F.M.

CIRCULATION
Neil J. O'Connell, O.F.M.

INTEREST is indexed by the Catholic Periodical Index

Copyright 1961 by Holy Name College
14th and Shepherd Streets, N. E.
Washington 17, D. C.

Printed in USA

HOLY NAME COLLEGE
FRANCISCAN HOUSE OF STUDIES
14th and Shepherd Streets, N. E.
Washington 17, D. C.

FOR YOU

Our inability to be present when INTEREST arrives makes us ponder your reactions. Had you forgotten us? You see, we want nothing but the best for you, but it takes time to present quality work. This issue, our second, includes the promised "Part Two" of the study on Sufficient Reflection. There is a provoking analysis of the Bonaventurian approach to Reality—A critical revision of the Oxford Movement—An illuminating presentation of St. Lawrence of Brindisi as a Doctor of the Church.

We, as you know, are Franciscan seminarians. Our primary purpose in publishing INTEREST is to stimulate our own knowledge and love of Theology. We send you this issue to share with you this knowledge and love.

Thank you,
THE EDITORS

cum permissu superiorum



Holy Name College—Washington, D. C.

HISTORY

The Order of Friars Minor was founded by Saint Francis of Assisi in the year of 1209, and before long the members of the Order were found in all parts of the world preaching the Gospel of Jesus Christ. The first members of the Order to come to the New World came as chaplains and missionaries with Christopher Columbus on his voyages of discovery.

Its objectives are: 1) the preaching and propagation of the Gospel by word and writing, 2) the care of souls and especially the administration of the sacraments, 3) the propagation and direction of the Franciscan Third Order, 4) the spiritual direction of souls and the preaching of retreats, 5) the works of the missions, both among the faithful and among the infidels, 6) the Christian education and instruction of youth, and the fostering of vocations to the religious and the priestly state, 7) Social Catholic Action and the works of charity (Gen. Con., Art. 219, 2).

Holy Name College is the major theological seminary for the Franciscan Fathers of the Province of the Most Holy Name. The motherhouse of the Province is located at St. Francis Monastery, 135 West 31st Street, New York, New York. The Province of the Most Holy Name comprises all the States along the Atlantic coast; it also has mission fields in China, Japan, Brazil, Bolivia, and Jamaica, as well as in Puerto Rico.

The College is a unit of the educational system of the Province, which also includes St. Bonaventure University and Christ the King Seminary, St. Bonaventure, New York; Siena College, Loudonville, New York; St. Joseph's Seminary, Callicoon, New York; St. Francis College, Rye Beach, New Hampshire; and the School of Pastoral Theology, St. Anthony's Monastery, Boston, Massachusetts.

Just before a disastrous fire in May of 1930 in which the seminary at St. Bonaventure was completely destroyed, the Superiors of the Province had determined to build a separate theologate for the clerics in Washington. Accordingly, Holy Name College was built and was formally dedicated on December 22, 1930, and has been the school of theology of the Province ever since.

CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL of the PACIFIC LIBRARY

IN OUR TRADITION

by NEIL J. O'CONNELL, O.F.M.

Chesterton once described St. Francis of Assisi as a man who stood on his head to look at the world. From such a vantage point Francis gained a new and penetrating insight into creation. A psychologist might say that Francis of Assisi reorganized the previous common perceptions of the universe into a new *gestalt.* Francis was overwhelmed by the fact that love was the catalyst of creation. His existence, the existence of the hills, the trees, the animals, and the men about him, were for St. Francis an act of Divine Love. Francis' vision of reality, as expressed in the *Canticle of the Sun,* transformed him into a human Seraph. This perception of God's creative love aroused simultaneously in him a dynamic affection for the Creator. All of Francis' activity from the moment he embraced the leper was then a life of dynamic love.

Such was the Seraphic legacy which St. Francis of Assisi bequeathed to the world and entrusted to his followers for safe-keeping. It was an inheritance which consumed its heirs as it had its testator. Dynamic affection became the peculiar shading of the Franciscan temperament.

The Franciscan inheritance, however, did not await the death of its Seraphic Founder to become effective. During the very life of St. Francis, St. Anthony of Padua had already assumed his portion of the bequest to himself. This *Evangelical Doctor* sought to renew society in God's love by first recasting the hearts of the clergy in the burning message of the Gospel.

The first academic application of the Seraphic touch was applied by Alexander of Hales, a renowned doctor of the University of Paris. In his *Glossa on the Four Books of Sentences,* he grasped the fundamental notion of the Franciscan movement: knowledge was for action; science only became wisdom when it moved toward loving union with its object—God.

Employing Augustinian terminology, St. Bonaventure gave deeper philosophic expression to the dynamic affection of St. Francis and in so doing became the *Seraphic Doctor.* Knowledge itself was considered to be the result of a Divine act of creative love which Bonaventure chose to call interior illumination. Every act of knowledge was then for Bonaventure only a means to unite one more fully with God. Knowledge that did not share in or bear one closer to Divine Love was vain and false. Theological knowledge especially was viewed by Bonaventure as essentially leading to the highest wisdom—mystical union with God. To this purpose all other sciences were directed, as Bonaventure taught in his *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum* and *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam.* Accordingly Bonaventure's concept of man avoided the pale, two-dimensional idea of Aristotle and delineated rather a more concrete concept of a fallen but redeemed person with a supernatural destiny.

The dynamic spirit that fired the *Canticle of the Sun* and enflamed Alexander of Hales, St. Anthony of Padua, and St. Bonaventure, likewise laid hold of John Duns Scotus. All the powers of Duns Scotus' intellect were concentrated upon celebrating the triumph of creative love in the Incarnation. In his thesis on the Kingship of Christ and its corollary proposition on the Immaculate Conception, John Duns Scotus proclaimed the pre-eminence of Divine Love. Christ, in Whom the love of the Creator and the love of the creature were marvelously blended, was exalted by Duns Scotus to draw the hearts of all men. Wholeheartedly, the *Subtle Doctor* joined the *Seraphic Doctor* in his rejection of a philosophy based entirely on natural grounds. Knowledge of human nature was faulty without knowledge of man's destiny—the Beatific Vision.

The renaissance of all reality in love inaugurated by Francis of Assisi was caught up by Roger Bacon who trained its beams upon the field of positive knowledge. Roger Bacon managed to effect a synthesis of affective spirituality and scientific observation and so prove the compatability of profane and divine science. Natural phenomena were investigated thoroughly, in an effort to enhance human life and so incline men more readily to loving their Creator. With this in mind he diverted the vain pursuits of Alchemy into the utilitarian channels of chemistry and so poured out foundations for medical advance. He focused all positive science ultimately toward the study of Sacred Scripture. The value of a particular scientific fact was rated according to the service it rendered in grasping and defending the loving revelation of truth which God had made to man.

Everywhere the Franciscans established themselves, education was made an integral part of their apostolate. Seats of Franciscan learning were established at Paris, Oxford, Bologna, Naples, Cambridge, Siena, Cracow, and Pisa; and could be found flourishing in the New World. But the goal of Seraphic scholarship differed vastly from other approaches to learning. In all their scholastic endeavors the Friars sowed a spirit of knowledge designed to draw men closer to the God Who is Love.

As in every preceding age, our own time offers its special challenge to Franciscan Seraphicism. On all fronts mankind is facinated with investigation and invention in the physical realm. From the reaches of outer space to the splitting of the atom men are spending themselves in ceaseless research. Yet, without the spark of Divine Love as its efficient and final cause this research has only served to trouble men's hearts. This, then, is the task for the Seraphic spirit to accomplish—the regeneration of positive science and simultaneously men's hearts in the love of God. It is a difficult commission, yet the very dynamism of the Seraphic spirit, as it has in the past, will ultimately reap success.

EVALUATIVE COGNITION

by MARTIN DE PORRES KEELY, O.F.M.

Sufficient reflection is rightly considered as one of the requirements for mortal sin. As was pointed out in a previous article,[1] recent moralists distinguish within this unique act of sufficient reflection two elements, conceptual cognition and evaluative cognition. The *conceptual element* is always *full,* in the sense that one either knows or does not know that his act constitutes a grave sin. The *evaluative element,* on the other hand, allows of *degrees,* in the sense that one may evaluate his action *more or less.* This raises the question: Where, on this scale of evaluation—between the points that mark no evaluative cognition and perfect evaluative cognition—is the point at which one has sufficiently evaluated his action, so that it might be gravely imputable? In other words, how much reflection is *sufficient* for grave sin?

TWO ASPECTS: ONE ACT

The distinction between conceptual cognition and evaluative cognition is best expressed in scholastic terminology as the distinction between the *quid sit* and the *quid valeat* of an act. The scholastic philosopher would correctly insist that this act of reflection is *one act.* The two kinds of cognition, he would tell us, are but two different aspects of one and the same act. As Fathers Hagmaier and Gleason observe, "The normal adult usually joins these two types of cognition in his every-day judgments concerning practical matters." [2] The Sacred Roman Rota declared more precisely in a decision in 1941 "that conceptual cognition and estimative [evaluative] cognition are regularly exercised according to nature *in the numerically same act.*" Further on we read, "Generally a man attains to both simultaneously in the same act of cognition." Both kinds of cognition "extend to *different aspects* of the same object." [3]

Any consideration of evaluative cognition eventually indicates that, although lying principally in the sphere of the intellect, it does involve the will. It is impossible to discuss this aspect of sufficient reflection without the will intruding itself into the discussion. The reason for this is that evaluative cognition involves both "apprehension and appetition of the *good,* whether of the rational order or of the merely sensitive order" and is "therefore a function both of the reason and the will." [4]

QUID VALEAT

As has been indicated, the object of evaluative cognition is what scholastic philosophy terms the *quid valeat* of an act. Where the philosopher would say that the will goes out to its object *sub specie boni,* the psychologist says that the will extends itself in a two-fold way: first, to the object itself and secondly, to the *value* of the object. One must take care to distinguish the *value* of an object from the *evaluation* of an object; they are not the same thing. A *value* is inherent in every object, whereas *evaluation* is inherent in the subject viewing an object. It is the subjective grasp of an objective *value.* The *substance* of an appetible good and the *perception* of its appetible goodness are by no means identical.

By "value" here is meant the *goodness* of an object —that quality which makes it *appetible.* Evaluation presupposes value. Thus, in the human act the will goes out, not merely to the object insofar as it is known *conceptually,* but also insofar as it is known *evaluatively.* This evaluative element of sufficient reflection involves something considerably more than a coldly detached sort of abstract knowledge.

The following passage from the aforementioned Rota decision may help clarify what has been stated thus far.

> Truly a man *apprehends* the "good" through the intellect not only *intellectually* "as good" but at the same time and in numerically the same act, he also appreciates or estimates and weighs that good when the intellect presents it to the will as that which it [the intellect] values, both in the abstract or in this or that order, and in the concrete for this particular act around this object. This *appreciation* is not merely an intellectual *representation* or the concept of value. For just as the *idea of weighing* some sort of material thing is not the same as the *weight* of the thing, so the appreciation of something is not the same as the concept or presentation of the value.[5]

Worthy of note is the use of such words in the Latin text as *ponderare, aestimare, appretiare,* and the like, in reference to evaluative cognition.

[1] Jude Murphy, O.F.M. and Martin Keely, O.F.M., "Sufficient Reflection for Mortal Sin," *Interest,* (Spring 1960), pp. 17-20.

[2] George Hagmaier, C.S.P. and Robert Gleason, S.J., *Counselling the Catholic* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959), p. 217.

[3] Sacrae Romanae Rotae decisiones, vol. 33, decisio 15, Nullitas Matrimonii coram Wynen, 25 Feb. 1941 (Rome: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1950), p. 152, par. 12 and p. 149, par. 8. Extensive use of this valuable source has been made throughout this discussion. It is highly recommended to the interested reader. Quotes taken from it will be designated henceforth under the title ROTA. The translations are our own. The emphasis is found in the original.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 148, par. 7.

[5] *Ibid.*

FOR EXAMPLE

In order to illustrate what has been said, the following is proposed for the reader's consideration. Let us suppose, as an example, that John Jones is the subject in question, that fire is the object in question, and that heat is its particular value. Unless John knows this value conceptually and *appreciates* its relation to his exposed hand, viz., it will burn his hand; then the act of burning his hand by putting it into the fire would not be a human act. It would not be done with sufficient reflection. Even if he had conceptual knowledge of the value, "heat-burns-me", and willed definitely to put his hand into the fire, his act would still not be human unless he was able to weigh, estimate, appreciate the relation of his action to his own well being. But let us now suppose that he did *appreciate* all this, even though he never actually experienced a burn, and that he nevertheless chose to put his hand into the fire in order to attain another value, e.g., the particular value attached to a thousand dollar bill which he had just inadvertently dropped into the fire. His act would certainly be a human act in such a case. He has evaluative, as well as conceptual, knowledge of all the elements that go into his act.



Note well—*experience is not necessary* for the formation of true evaluative knowledge about some object or act. ". . . the *appreciation* of a value is one thing and the *experience* of a value is another. The former can be completely present . . . even though the latter is simply lacking." [6]

IMPORTANCE OF EVALUATIVE COGNITION

In the act of sufficient reflection, the *evaluation* of an object is equally as important as the mere perception of the value. One who cannot perceive and weigh the value of an object in any specific order of virtue cannot be said to seek or will an object in that order by a free and deliberate act. For instance, a person may be scrupulous with regard to one virtue and lax with regard to another. Or a kleptomaniac, for example, may be said to be unfree in that specific order of virtue which governs respect for *res alienae*. This lack of freedom in any specific order of virtue is traced back ultimately, not to the will, but to the intellect where sufficient evaluative knowledge is lacking. When one fails to appreciate, estimate, weigh the value of an object, the object "must be said to be deprived of a transcendental and essential quality with respect to the will seeking."[7] In other words, if the intellect fails in its subjective grasp of the objective value of an object or act, then that value does not exist so far as a deliberate will is concerned. Since the value is not known evaluatively, it cannot be presented to the will. And since it is not present to the will, the value lacks that existence in the subject-willing which it would have to have in order to be a "good willed."

The importance of this evaluative element is especially clear in reference to "agibilia." Concrete judgments about whether one may or may not act licitly in a specific instance demand a sufficiency of evaluative cognition. The perfection of one's knowledge of the *quid sit* and the *quid valeat* of an object or act determines whether his reflection is sufficient or not.

MATURITY

It would seem that evaluative cognition *matures* as the individual matures mentally. A child of four or five may be able to predicate correctly goodness or badness of an act and still not weigh, estimate, appreciate the meaning behind the concept of sin. As Father John J. Lynch remarks, "The dawning of the evaluative concept is gradual in a child. It is impossible to say just when this realization comes, but until it does come it is impossible to conceive of the child as guilty of real [formal] sin."[8]

The same idea has been expressed equivalently in the previously cited Rota decision of 1941. It states clearly that "the use of reason which is required for all human acts envisions both conceptual cognition and estimative cognition, and demands the capacity both for the *exercise* of and *dominion* over reason." The decision goes on to declare: "Experience testifies that merely conceptual cognition is formed first and more easily; estimative cognition is acquired afterward and with more difficulty."[9] Thus it is that the maturity of an individual determines, in no small way, the perfection of his evaluation of a given object or act.

Conceptual cognition is acquired earlier and more easily in the development of an individual than is evaluative cognition. The child may know quite clearly that this is good or that is bad, but his *appreciation* and *estimation* of these facts requires more time and effort. This appreciation has been equated with the discretion and maturity of judgment which is proportionate to performing a particular act. Thus, some acts demand more of this evaluative element than others, e.g., taking solemn vows or entering into a marriage contract require more evaluative cognition than do lighting a cigarette or buying a newspaper. As has been said by the Roman Rota:

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 149, par. 8.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 147, par. 5.

[8] John J. Lynch, S.J., "Notes on Moral Theology," *Theological Studies*, 17 (June, 1956), p. 169.

[9] ROTA, p. 149, par. 8.

> . . . mere cognition of the *quid sit* is not sufficient to validly contract marriage; such cognition can be had even by a child; but beyond this, *maturity of judgment* is required which is proportionate to entering into a matrimonial contract.[10]

The attainment of that maturity of judgment necessary for the commission of a grave sin or for the performance of an heroic act of virtue would, it seems, necessarily be realized less quickly than that which is necessary for acts of lesser importance. For, as Father Fanfani has remarked, "there is no more important affair than eternal salvation!"[11] Hence, acts touching upon this require considerably more evaluative cognition than do lesser acts.

Both emotional and spiritual maturity play their part in the formation of sufficient evaluative cognition. Here Father Andre Snoeck, S.J., might be cited. He contends that the objective judgment of Christian morality "is valid for an act posited voluntarily by a man who has reached his *spiritual maturity* and who acts with sufficient liberty."[12] The dawning of such maturity is a part of the attainment of the ability to sufficiently evaluate one's acts insofar as they have moral significance.

EMOTIONS

It would be well to look a little further into the emotional factor insofar as it affects evaluative cognition. Psychologists, philosophers, and moralists universally concede that there is a definite correlation between a person's emotions and the state of his knowledge. Dr. Rudolph Allers asserts that "human acts are determined not only by reason but very much by emotional factors . . ."[13] More to the point, Fathers Hagmaier and Gleason have remarked that "evaluation can be impeded by so many emotional factors that even though abstract knowledge of the act is present, the emotional or habitual factors affecting the evaluative knowledge may drive this knowledge to the background of consciousness. In that case the knowledge sufficient for grave sin is lacking."[14]

Any *Tractatus De Actibus Humanis* would confirm the foregoing remarks. Passion is always mentioned among those things which lessen or completely take away from the *voluntarium*. Hence, a person might be so "disturbed" that he "cannot estimate at least the substance of the act to be performed" and hence "is impeded in the natural faculty of appreciating, either from some sort of actual and transitory impediment . . . or from an habitual defect."[15]

Certain "sentiments" and groupings of motives lend emotional tone to a person's knowledge. This must be taken into consideration when examining the perfection of such knowledge. As Father Cammack, S.J., admits:

> It is almost universally accepted now that real moral action is not based on mere abstract knowledge, but on deeper "sentiments" which provide adequate motives for action by organizing groups of emotions around, and in association with, certain intellectual perceptions.[16]

Given a defect in a particular person's emotional reactions, is this always indicative of a psychopathological state? It does not seem so, for several reasons. First, psychologists tell us that "it is quite normal to assume a gradual transition between normal and pathological emotional reactions."[17] A person might conceivably suffer from such an emotional defect and consequently lack the knowledge sufficient for grave sin without technically being a pathological case. From one point of view, he would tend in that direction, but a more positive analysis might well place him in that amorphous mass termed "normal." (Normal, here, might be defined as—he who does not fulfill the requirements for any known mental disorder.) Secondly, the Roman Rota gives as examples of those laboring under habitual defect, resulting in a lack of evaluative knowledge, those suffering from certain morbid states, *as well as* those classified as "psychic anomalies." Such anomalous individuals need not be pathological. The infinite variety of experiences that go into the making of an emotionally mature man allows the possibility of one or the other individual developing without ever having achieved the power to evaluate sufficiently his activity in one or the other sphere. Such activity could not be genuinely imputed to him. He might appear and be considered quite "normal." But, is he?

This might lead one to contend that it is not inconceivable for certain "normal" individuals to exist who perform materially sinful acts without being formally guilty of grave sin. It might be said that, despite their "normalcy," they lack sufficient evaluative knowledge for grave sin, due to defect in their emotional reactions. Such lack of knowledge could be vincible or invincible. If the former, then they are guilty; if the latter, they are guiltless.

IGNORANCE

Passion has already been mentioned as a factor which lessens or completely takes away from the *voluntarium*. Ignorance is a similar impediment. In this context, it would be valuable to quote a length once more from the decision of the Roman Rota:

> It is one thing for a man *to lack* the required estimative cognition and another thing for him *to neglect it* . . . If a man, who on account of his age must be presumed to be endowed with the power of sufficiently estimating a thing, nevertheless is said to have acted without sufficient estimative cognition, it can proceed from the fact that he either *will not* or *can not* estimate or weigh the thing to be done sufficiently. He who does not *will* to form this cognition generally does not escape subjective imputability . . . since his ignorance is affected, and he can often discern whether he truly lacked sufficient estimative cognition, even confused or implicit.[18]

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 168, par. 28.

[11] P. Ludovicus Fanfani, O.P., *Manuale Theorico-Practicum Theologiae Moralis ad Mentem D. Thomae* (Rome: Libraria "Ferrari," 1949), I, n. 318 b.

[12] Andre Snoeck, S.J., "Masturbation et peche grave," *Cahiers Laennec*, 10 (1950), p. 25. Translated in *New Problems in Medical Ethics*, edited by Peter Flood, O.S.B., I (Westminister, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1953), p. 39.

[13] Rudolph Allers, "Annulment of Marriage by Lack of Consent because of Insanity," *Ecclesiastical Review*, 101 (1939), p. 336.

[14] Hagmaier and Gleason, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

[15] ROTA, p. 150, par. 9.

[16] J. S. Cammack, S.J., *Moral Problems of Mental Defect* (New York: Benziger, 1939), p. 95, note.

[17] Rudolph Allers, "Abnormality: A Chapter in Moral Psychology" (II. Some Facts and Notions on Mental Troubles), *Homiletic and Pastoral Review*, 42 (Jan. 1942), p. 352.

[18] ROTA, p. 150, par. 9.

It would be false to say, then, that a lack of sufficient evaluative knowledge automatically excuses from sin. One must apply the general rules concerning vincible and invincible ignorance to discover whether or not a person's act was imputable. It seems safe to state as a general norm that anyone who is "disturbed" as a result of truly psychopathological states would be invincibly ignorant with regard to evaluative cognition.

But what of the aforementioned "normal" individual? Could he be thus invincibly ignorant? It would seem so. Quite conceivably, such a person could grow up and never have acquired the power to evaluate his activity sufficiently in a particular sphere. Such an individual would be a "psychic anomaly" to be sure. He might be said to "underevaluate." If this were through no fault of his own, he would be guiltless in the sight of God. If he pushes evaluative cognition out of his consciousness or deliberately prevents its formation, he would be guilty *in causa* of any sinful activity he performed as a result of his ignorance.

IN SUMMARY

The meaning and function of evaluative cognition might be summarized thus: it is that aspect of the unique act of sufficient reflection by which the subject-knowing *appreciates* the *value* of an object or an act. It is the operation of certain intellectual *affectiones* upon an object intellectually apprehended whereby one comes to an existential perception of the *good* he seeks and its relation to himself.

The whole concept of evaluative cognition is implicit in the practice of the Church. Canon law excuses a number of persons from responsibility under the law on the presumption of certain cognitive inadequacies.[19] Indeed, the very practice of the Church in demanding *sufficient* reflection as a prerequisite for grave sin presupposes the existence of evaluative cognition. As the author of the Rota decision has declared, this doctrine was "not unknown to ancient scholastic philosophy," but rather it "is in accord with the principles of scholastic philosophy." He adds, however, that "it is necessary that this same doctrine be more accurately investigated, especially that part which has been hitherto almost completely neglected in moral theology and canon law."[20] Recent advances in psychology have made clear the necessity of a more thorough investigation of the truths implicit in our traditional moral philosophy. On the other hand, "one must be very cautious lest new terminology beget confusion, nor should one be drawn to false or even pernicious consequences."[21] Among such consequences would be the contention that mortal sin is impossible or extremely difficult to commit. The pernicious nature of such a position is obvious. So, too, is its falsity. The Ten Commandments carry with them the implication that they can be kept or broken by the generality of mankind. They were not laid down for some few rare individuals who are capable of great good or great evil. It can not be concluded, then, that the prerequisites for grave sin are only rarely fulfilled. Among these prerequisites is evaluative cognition.

However, this is not to deny that "subjective disabilities and impediments excuse the average man and woman from mortal guilt much more frequently than a [casual] reading of the moral theology manuals might lead one to believe."[22] Yet, one must remember always that, in spite of all the testimony of psychology and the other sciences, the testimony of an *enlightened conscience* is still the best guide to a correct understanding of the state of a soul. The late Pope, Pius XII, emphasised this point again and again. He has said:

> The normal man has what we might call an unlearned psychology, which comes from his very nature, and which enables him to make the proper decisions in the ordinary problems of daily life, provided that he follows his sound common sense, his knowledge of reality and the advice of his own experience.[23]

The same Holy Father was equally insistent in declaring that we must beware of those doctrines which would take away from man the power of placing morally significant acts. He said, "Original sin did not take away from man the possibility or the obligation of directing his own actions himself through his soul."[24]

Thus it is that we must recognize the "psychic anomaly" for what he is, an exception. A lack of sufficient evaluative cognition in a so called "normal" individual is *not* normal. It commands recognition and correction whenever possible. As Bishop Wright of Pittsburgh remarked several years ago:

> [We] must recognize and make allowance for the inadequate and the unfortunate; but we must not treat their condition as the normal condition of mankind, and we must not spin our moral philosophy around their deficiencies. In our sympathy, we must not place emphasis on excuse rather than on responsibility and thus spread a demoralizing social philosophy. We must make responsibility the universal norm and excuse the challenged exception.[25]

It should be obvious that the considerations treated in this present article are not intended to be in any way definitive. It has been our hope that the questions raised will prove suggestive for further speculation concerning that unique act which is sufficient reflection. No more was intended; no less could be hoped for.

[19] cf. canons 12, 88-9, 2199-2211.

[20] ROTA, p. 148, par. 7 and p. 151, par. 11.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 152, par. 12.

[22] John C. Ford, S.J. and Gerald Kelly, S.J., *Contemporary Moral Theology* (Westminister, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1958), I, p. 239.

[23] AAS, 47 (1955), p. 510.

[24] AAS, 45 (1953), p. 280.

[25] Bishop Wright, "The Philosophy of Responsibility" (a sermon delivered at the Red Mass in the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, January 16, 1949).

AN APPROACH TO THINGS

by NOEL A. FITZPATRICK, O.F.M.

The transition from the theological thinker to the mystic theologian is a swift and radical change by which one for whom all things illustrate and illuminate God, becomes one for whom God illustrates and illumines all things. It is somewhat like the reversal experienced by a young man in love: in the beginning of his love, "she" looks like a rose; then, later and suddenly, all roses remind him of her. St. Bonaventure's approach to reality is such a reversal. To St. Bonaventure, the entire cosmos is caught up in God: each individual reality is created according to its own eternal idea in the Divine Essence; each and every creature, from the smallest seed to the gigantic galaxies of stars, has meaning and value solely because it is a real reflection of the most Holy and Undivided Trinity.[1]

Unfortunately, St. Bonaventure's teaching on the refulgence of the most Holy Trinity in the whole and in each part of creation is given scant attention in current theological books and, sadly, is dismissed too often by the modern theologian with the smug: "It's all too poetical for me!" Such a reaction, however, reveals both an error and a lack of courage. The error lies in a failure to understand that St. Bonaventure's speculation is based more on the rhythm of analogy than on rigorous logical sequence. The modern theologian does not grasp that the Bonaventurian approach is characterized by an inner religious quality, a constant rapport with revelation, a mysticism grounded in scientific culture, and a profound learning harmonized throughout with the simplicity and gentle humility of his spiritual father, St. Francis of Assisi. The lack of courage reveals a failure to make the necessary effort to discover precisely what the Bonaventurian perspective means. It is not an easy task to enter the mind of St. Bonaventure. His was no ordinary mind: brilliant, yet simple; deeply mystical, yet totally scholastic; a delicate instrument, it interpreted the harmony and melody of reality in its own way. We must listen patiently and humbly, allowing Bonaventure his own choice of language, not permitting our attention to be distracted by thoughts which appear strange to our modern world.

Imbued with the one desire to prove scientifically that the vision of St. Francis was truly authentic, St. Bonaventure directed all his energies and talents to prove that reality is the mirror of the Creative Trinity. We do well to listen to him, for he points out to us the supreme adventure of the spirit, the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum.* But we must come to St. Bonaventure with an open mind and a clear vision if we are to experience the allurement of his Franciscan approach.

AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT:

All Catholic theologians have accepted the principle of divine exemplarism with its consequence of the preformation of all creatures in the Divine Essence. It

can be summarized briefly as follows: In the act of creation God, the Intelligent Being, acts in the light of knowledge; He executes His decisions under the direction of the idea which He has of the work to be realized; Creation is an imitation of the eternal idea existing in the Divine Essence; the Divine Essence is the Exemplar in imitation of Which creatures are made copies of the Divine Model. St. Bonaventure not only assented to the principle of divine exemplarism, but also made it the basis of his theological approach to reality and carried the principle to its most logical, factual, and ultimate conclusion: the most Holy and Undivided Trinity is the Exemplar of every creature.

Although the *fact* of the preformation of creatures in God by means of the divine ideas was universally accepted, it nevertheless brought with it a very deep and vexing problem: the reconciliation of the *plurality* of ideas with the *simplicity* of the Divine Essence. St. Thomas solved this apparent contradiction by affirming that the eternal ideas are only *virtually* distinct from each other and from the Divine Essence. The Angelic Doctor upheld that all creatures are preformed in God by means of one *virtus* in the Divine Essence and hence each creature does not have its own idea in the Divine Mind. St. Bonaventure solved the problem by asserting that each creature does have its own idea in the Divine Essence. The Seraphic Doctor posited a *formal distinction ex natura rei* between the eternal ideas and the Divine Essence, and hence for him all things were *properly* contained in God.

In St. Bonaventure's approach to this problem of the plurality and the simplicity of the Divine Essence it is always the *Supreme Perfection* of the Godhead that is stressed. Bonaventure argues that the very Perfection of the Divine Essence militates against anything

[1] I have used Rev. Titus Szabo's book *De SS. Trinitate in creaturis refulgente. Doctrina S. Bonaventurae* (Rome: Herder, 1955) as my main source, inspiration, and guide throughout this essay. Rev. Szabo is one of the outstanding authorities on St. Bonaventure. At present he is assigned to the renowned research center at St. Bonaventure College in Quaracchi, Florence. His book is the first comprehensive synthesis of St. Bonaventure's teaching on the analogy of the Trinity in creatures and formed the basis for my dissertation, "The Doctrine of the Vestige in St. Bonaventure," submitted to the Faculty of the Department of Philosophy at St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, New York on August 2, 1960, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

existing in It in a confused, obscure, virtual or potential state. Here, as in many other places, St. Bonaventure employs Augustinian principles: the singular and the universal must be represented in the Divine Mind with the greatest actuality, with its proper and perfect idea; each and every creature must have its own proper idea in God according to which it is created. For St. Bonaventure, therefore, the Supreme Perfection of the Godhead demands that just as the Creator excels the creature, so should the *distinct* and *objective* representation of things in the Divine Essence excel the shadowy existence of things. St. Bonaventure insists that the distinction which best emphasizes the Divine *Perfection* but in no way diminishes the Divine *Simplicity* is the formal distinction *ex natura rei*. In defending this position St. Bonaventure adheres to the example of St. Francis who *saw* God in each created reality. Bonaventure's whole exposition merely *proves* that such a vision is eminently reasonable.

THE BONAVENTURIAN EXEMPLARISM:

The doctrine of divine exemplarism is the solid foundation of the whole theological system of St. Bonaventure. In all the divisions of his thought exemplarism is centrally located and holds the prominent and essential position. Why? Because St. Bonaventure firmly held that in order to understand creation we must first have some understanding of the Creator. In his theological approach to reality he definitively states that it is in the attempt to understand the nature of the Exemplar that we are able to begin to understand what created being is, that we are able to discover the *raison d'être* of the creature's existence, the final activity of its nature and the value of its meaning. Indeed, for St. Bonaventure the principle of divine exemplarism "is the only perspective in which the created universe ceases to be an unintelligible confusion and becomes accessible to reason."[2]

God, the Highest Intelligent Cause, always acts in conformity with His ideas. The ideas, therefore, exert an exemplary causality; they are the pattern according to which the Divine Artist executes His action. But the eternal ideas, because they are conceptions of God's intellect, are identical with God's Essence. God, then, conceives His ideas from His own Essence. Thus, in knowing creatures God is not dependent on anything outside Himself, but knows all things by means of the ideas which exist in Himself, because the object of the Divine Intellect is the Divine Essence. The Divine Artist must conceive the eternal ideas from His essential divine attributes. The essential divine attributes are the foundation of the divine ideas. God is the Model in imitation of Whom creatures are made, to Whom creatures are conformed and configured. Creation is but the imitation in time of the eternal ideas in the Divine Mind.

ST. BONAVENTURE: THE HOLY TRINITY IS THE EXEMPLAR OF ALL THINGS:

For St. Bonaventure the Ultimate Exemplar of each and every creature is the most Holy and Undivided Trinity. God is One in Essence and Three in Persons. Is God the Exemplar of creatures by reason of the Unity of His Essence, or by reason of the Trinity of Persons, or by reason of Both? St. Bonaventure put the question this way: "Are created things in God by reason of His Essence or His Persons?"[3] Revelation teaches us that in the Holy Trinity some things pertain to the Divine Essence only, e.g. being is entirely common to the Three Persons. Other things pertain only to the Persons, e.g. the real distinction of the Divine Persons among themselves. Finally, still other things pertain neither to the Essence nor to the Persons taken separately but to the Essence and Persons conjointly, e.g. the act of creation, and, in general, divine causality. Exemplarism is a type of divine causality. Hence the first Exemplar of creatures is God, One and Three.

St. Bonaventure constantly stressed that every aspect of divine causality pertains to the essential attributes. Of all the essential attributes he has a definite preference for three: power, wisdom, and will. He bases his preference on Sacred Scripture which seems to root all divine causality in these specific attributes. But Bonaventure does not stop there; all causality or productive operation on the part of an intelligent being derives ultimately from the person, the *principium quod* of the operation. The essence is the *principium quo*. Hence, by themselves or through themselves the *essential attributes* cannot cause things. It is only insofar as they pertain to the Three Divine Persons that the essential attributes exercise causality, for *actiones sunt suppositorum*. To really grasp the meaning of divine exemplarism as St. Bonaventure expounded it, the activity of the Essence and the Persons must be joined. The essential attributes do not cause things unless they refer to the Persons, and the Persons exert causality only insofar as they possess the essential attributes. St. Bonaventure next reasons to the existence of a *special likeness* between the Divine Persons and the three essential attributes of power, wisdom, and goodness.

Once more, St. Bonaventure places this special likeness in those attributes which hold the first place in the formation of creatures, namely, in wisdom, power, and will. These three attributes, he says, "are most especially those in which the highest Trinity is praised in the Scriptures."[4] These three essential attributes are appropriations of the Divine Persons, and it is by means of these appropriations that we can say creatures are exemplarily preformed in the God Who is One in Essence and Three in Persons.

Here a theological difficulty naturally arises. All activities *ad extra* are common to the Three Divine Persons. Isn't St. Bonaventure saying that *only* the Person of the Father is reflected in power? Isn't this

[2] E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, trans. Dom Illtyd Trethowan and F. J. Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938) p. 214. For further reference on the exemplarism of St. Bonaventure see J. M. Bissen, *L'Exemplarisme divin selon S. Bonaventure*, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1929).

[3] *Sent. I*, d. 36, a. 1, q. 2; *Opera Omnia* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882-1902), I, 621. [This translation and all translations in this essay are mine with the one exception of Philotheus Boehner's translation of St. Bonaventure's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*.]

[4] *Breviloquium*, I, c. 6; *Opera Omnia*, V, 215b.

a denial of the Unity and Inseparability of the Divine Persons in Their activities *ad extra?* A difficulty exists certainly and St. Bonaventure acknowledges it. Yet he overcomes it because he posits a *special likeness* between the Divine Persons and the essential attributes. He bases this special likeness on the appropriations found in Sacred Scripture.

THE APPROPRIATED MANIFESTATION OF THE THREE DIVINE PERSONS:

The Divine Persons exercise exemplary causality in the creation of all reality. This causality cannot be appropriated to the Divine Persons by reason of any *mutual relation* among themselves. It is attributed to Them insofar as They refer to creatures which They cause. The Three Divine Persons refer to creatures by means of the essential attributes, and it is from the essential attributes that the Divine Intellect conceives the eternal ideas of things. But there is a special likeness between the essential attributes of power and the Person of the Father, between the essential attribute of wisdom and the Person of the Son, and between the essential atribute of will and the Person of the Holy Spirit.

Because of the Unity of the Divine Essence, all things are common to the Three Divine Persons where there is no opposition of mutual relation. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the ONE PRINCIPLE of every creature, since exemplary causality imports no mutual relation of the Persons among themselves but only a relationship to creatures. Bonaventure stresses this *unity* and *inseparability* of the Divine Persons in their operations concerning creatures: "That the most Blessed Trinity has inseparability in operation is noted when it is said, 'There are three that bear witness in heaven . . .' but even though there are Three Persons they give a witness that is one and undivided."[5] In other words, St. Bonaventure is saying that no creature can be formed in imitation of One of the Divine Persons without at the same time inseparably reflecting the other Two. There is nothing in any created being exclusively proper to only One of the Divine Persons.

Yet, St. Bonaventure does insist on the *special likeness* between the essential attributes and each of the Divine Persons. By this special likeness he means: the Personal property of the Father, primacy in production, is reflected in the essential attribute of power;[6] the Personal property of the Son, the intellectual fruit of generation, is reflected in the essential attribute of wisdom;[7] and the Personal property of the Holy Spirit, the Personification of the mutual love of the Father and the Son, is reflected in the essential attribute of will.[8]

The most Holy and Undivided Trinity is, therefore, reflected in each and every created thing:

> The Triune God testifies that he is triune through the vestiges of omnipotence, wisdom and benevolence. And because the vestiges of omnipotence, wisdom, and benevolence are reflected in each and every creature—for there is no creature that completely lacks power, truth, and goodness—it is clear that the Triune God manifests Himself and testifies that he is triune through the universality of every creature.[9]

The Exemplar of each creature is, therefore, the Triune God because all divine causality *ad extra* must be attributed equally to the Three Divine Persons. The most Holy Trinity is the Exemplar of every creature and each creature is a sign of the Trinity.

St .Bonaventure goes on to show that the Trinity is reflected in creatures in three hierarchical degrees, namely, by means of the vestige, the image, and the similitude. *All things are vestiges* of God for all things are effects of the exemplary causality of the Trinity. *Man is the image* of God because in man there is discernible a deeper and more intrinsic resemblance to the Trinity. *The similitude of God is the soul in sanctifying grace,* the soul which is a participant in the very life of the Divine Trinity. Viewed under the principle of exemplarism, all creatures are in analogy with the Creative Trinity; in every creature there is a refulgence of the Divine Exemplar; and each creature can lead us to a knowledge of the Triune God:

> All creatures in this visible world lead the spirit of the contemplative and wise man to the eternal God. For all creatures are shadows, echoes, and pictures of that first, most powerful, most wise, and most perfect Principle . . . [all things] are vestiges, images, and displays presented to us for the contuition of God, and the divinely given signs wherein we see God . . . From all this one can gather that since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made.[10]

A PROBLEM STATED:

In order to point up more clearly that his teaching on the refulgence of the Trinity was true, St. Bonaventure solved the classical and vexing problem of the reconciliation of the plurality of ideas and the simplicity of the Divine Essence. No one doubted the *fact* of the preformation of creatures in God. But *how* this preformation took place, the manner of its operation, created the very difficult problem: how to harmonize the *plurality* of ideas with the *simplicity* of the Divine Essence? Any solution must preserve the dogmatically

[5] *De triplici testimonio SS. Trinitatis,* nn. 1-2; *Opera Omnia,* V, 535a.

[6] "Because the Divine Essence is First it is the principle or productive power of other essences. Thus the Person of the Father is First because He is from no one else. And the Person of the Father is the Principle and has fecundity in relation to the other Persons." *Sent. I,* d. 2, a. un., q. 2 fund. 4; *Opera Omnia,* I, 53b.

[7] "This is extolled by the authority of Sacred Scripture which appropriates the common things to the Divine Persons, e.g. power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit." *Sent. I,* d. 34, a. un., q. 3 fund. 2; *Opera Omnia,* I, 592a.

[8] "To proceed through the mode of will and liberality is twofold: In one way that which is not liberality proceeds through the mode of liberality and what it becomes or is given comes from liberality—this is the way creatures proceed from God; In the second way that which is liberality itself proceeds as love—in this way the Holy Spirit, as Love, proceeds from God, the Holy Spirit Who is the gift in which all gifts are given." *Sent. I,* d. 6, a. un., q. 3 in corp.; *Opera Omnia,* I, 129b.

[9] *De triplici testimonio SS. Trinitatis,* n. 7; *Opera Omnia,* V, 536b.

[10] Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., *Saint Bonaventure's Itinerarium mentis in Deum,* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1956), "Text with Translation," c. 2, nn. 11 and 13, pp. 60-61.

defined Simplicity of the Divine Essence and the theologically certain preformation of creatures. Theologians reduced the problem to the inquiry: what *distinction* can reconcile the Unity of the Divine Essence with the Plurality of attributes and ideas?

St. Bonaventure's solution was based on two very important considerations. First, the principle of St. Augustine, that each and every being has its own idea in the Divine Essence.[11] Second, the firm conviction that the Supreme Perfection of the Divine Essence demands a plurality of ideas.[12] St. Bonaventure asserted that the distinction which best emphasized the Divine Perfection, but in no way diminished the Divine Simplicity, is the *formal distinction ex natura rei.*[13]

Why did St. Bonaventure adopt the formal distinction? Simply because it seemed to him that the Absolute Perfection of the Divine Essence demanded it. Before we give specific attention to the formal distinction it is necessary to understand St. Bonaventure's conception of the Perfection of the Divine Essence.

THE SUPREME PERFECTION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE:

Fully in accord with Catholic Theology, St. Bonaventure teaches that the Divine Essence is absolutely simple. Without any qualification the Seraphic Doctor regarded the Divine Essence as the purest actuality without any admixture of potentiality. Any real distinction between the eternal ideas would, he strenuously asserts, destroy the Simplicity of the Divine Essence.

On the other hand, St. Bonaventure constantly speaks of the Supreme Perfection of the Divine Essence and consequently reaches out to touch the very immeasurableness of the Infinite. Bonaventure conceived the Divine Essence as a Supreme Font of Fecundity and guides us with a sure hand into the very heart of God's nature in order to disclose to us something of the ineffable richness of that Infinite Life. He emphasizes that the Perfection of the Divine Essence militates against anything existing in It in a confused, obscure, virtual or potential state. Time and time again he employs the principle of St. Augustine: the singular and the universal must be represented in the Divine Mind with the greatest actuality, with its *proper, specific* and *formal* idea. The Supreme Perfection of the Divine Essence demands that it contain the distinct and objective representation of all things.[14]

THE FORMAL DISTINCTION:

The distinction that St. Bonaventure proposes to reconcile the plurality and the Simplicity of the Divine Essence is one *intrinsic* to the Divine Essence. It arises from the very nature of the Divine Essence. It is the formal distinction *ex natura rei.* The very nature of the Perfection of the Divine Essence demands that it possess the *distinct* and *specific* idea of each created reality. Thus, the eternal ideas must be distinct among themselves and distinct from the Divine Essence *before* any consideration of the human mind, *before* the creation of contingent being, *before* the Divine Essence compares Itself with creatures. This formal distinction is not a real distinction if we take real to mean the distinction between two *separable* things (*inter rem et rem*). But, *it is real in the sense that the mind discovers it but does not project it into reality.* The formal distinction exists before any consideration of the mind; it exists *ex natura rei,* and in this case the *res* is the Supreme Perfection of the Divine Essence.[15] The basis for the formal distinction, therefore, is the actual ideas present in the Divine Essence before, and independent of, the distinguishing activities of the intellect.

This formal distinction of the divine ideas is not a real distinction as is the one among the Three Divine Persons. The real distinction of the Persons arises from the mutual relations by which They refer to One Another or by which they are opposed to One Another. The eternal ideas have no mutual relations. They do not refer to themselves, but to creatures of which they are representative forms. Hence, this formal distinction, although real in the sense that it arises from the nature of the Divine Essence independently of the human mind, is not real in the way the distinction between the Persons is real. The formal distinction of the eternal ideas does not impugn the Divine Simplicity, for even though formally distinct, the eternal ideas "are so one that they make for no composition, nor do they diminish simplicity."[16] Yet, St. Bonaventure admits that this formal distinction is a concept difficult to grasp unless one constantly "understands that the Divine Essence is Supreme Simplicity with *Supreme Perfection.*"[17]

In order to grasp more clearly the formal distinction of St. Bonaventure it will be well to consider briefly the brilliant solution that St. Thomas offered to this

[11] Augustine, *De diversionibus questionibus,* 83, q. 46, n. 2; (*PL* 40, 30).

[12] "One does not see this clearly unless he likewise understands that the Divine Essence is supreme simplicity with supreme immensity or perfection. In what follows we will investigate how this can be understood, but now we must accept it as certain and absolute so that we may correctly understand the divine simplicity according to the demands of the divine conditions." *De Mysterio Trinitatis,* q. 3, a. 1 in corp.; *Opera Omnia,* I. 70b.

[13] Titus Szabo, O.F.M., *"De distinctionis formalis origine bonaventuriana disquisitio historico-critica,"* in *Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda. (Acta Congressus scholastici internationalis Romae, Anno Sancto MCML celebrati,* Rome, 1951) pp. 379-445.

[14] "The exemplary models are not something outside the Divine Intellect but are essentially in It. On the other hand, because the Divine Intellect, the highest light and pure act, represents, It, therefore, represents most lucidly, most expressedly, most perfectly, and hence equally, and is in no wise diminished by the intention of the model. Thus He knows all things most perfectly, distinctly and entirely." *De Scientia Christi,* q. 2 in corp.; *Opera Omnia,* V, 9a.

[15] "Because the divine knowledge is most perfect, it very distinctly knows universal and singular things and represents all things most distinctly and perfectly. Hence the divine knowledge possesses the forms and ideas of singular things as the most perfectly expressed models of things." *Breviloquium,* I, c. 8; *Opera Omnia,* V, 217a.

[16] *De Mysterio Trinitatis,* q. 3, a. 1 in corp.; *Opera Omnia,* I, 70b.

[17] *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

problem. The Angelic Doctor posited his famous virtual distinction and thereby reconciled plurality and simplicity.

ST. THOMAS AND THE VIRTUAL DISTINCTION:

St. Thomas stated "that the perfections of all things which belong to different things through diverse forms, must be attributed to God through one and the same *virtus* in Him.[18] This *"one virtus"* is most perfectly equivalent to all perfections. The Divine Essence contains all perfections in an equivalent or virtual way, just as ten pennies are in a dime, or ten units in the number of ten.[19] The virtual distinction consists in this, that the Divine Essence *has a capacity* of producing in our mind different concepts of Itself. But so far as the Divine Essence Itself is concerned there is no actual distinction nor composition, yet It is such that by Its very nature It tends to give rise to different concepts. Every *intrinsic* distinction in the Divine Essence is denied; distinction and plurality are *extrinsic* to the Divine Essence because the eternal ideas "are caused . . . by the Divine Intellect comparing Its own essence with things."[20]

In the position of St. Thomas, then, there are no distinct ideas of each creature in the Divine Essence but only one *virtus* or idea which equivalently contains all things. Plurality and distinction arise from the fact that the infinite wealth of the unnumbered perfection of the divine Simplicity is imitated in diverse and multiple ways by the creature. The Divine Intellect does not possess a distinct idea according to which each creature is produced, because the Divine Essence Itself is undistinguished and can in no way possess separate or distinct ideas. It conceives the distinct ideas when It compares Its Essence with the creature imitating It.

A COMPARISON:

St. Thomas, it is well to remember, does not consider the Supreme Perfection of the Godhead in his attempt at a solution to the Simplicity of the Divine Essence and the plurality of eternal ideas. Intent on the Divine Simplicity, St. Thomas upholds that any distinction of the divine ideas is one that is *extrinsic* to the Divine Essence; i.e., it arises from the fact that creatures imitate the *one virtus* of the Divine Essence in multiple ways. St. Bonaventure, however, posits that the distinction of the divine ideas is *intrinsic* to the Divine Essence, i.e. it arises within that very Essence Itself because of the *nature of Its Perfection.*

St. Bonaventure, then, discounts the virtual distinction of St. Thomas as the solution to this problem because while it does preserve the Divine Simplicity, it does not reasonably explain the Absolute Perfection of the Divine Essence. For how can the Divine Essence be supreme perfection if It represents all things by a common idea, or by the one *virtus?* To reply that a thing is so represented in the Divine Essence that it is *as if* it existed in its own proper idea does not solve the difficulty. Bonaventure takes as an axiom that just as the Creator excels the creature so should the distinct and objective representation excel the shadowy existence of things.[21] Bonaventure further argues that the virtual distinction seems to diminish the sovereign independence of the Divine Essence: if the Divine Essence must compare itself with creatures in order to obtain the distinct idea of a creature then It does not suffice of Itself to represent things in their highest brilliance. The Angelic Doctor affirms that perfections are in God by means of *one virtus;* Bonaventure affirms that they are present with *their own specific and objective form.* St. Thomas places the origin of the distinction of the divine ideas outside of God, or *extrinsic* to His Essence; St. Bonaventure posits that it arises from the very nature of the Divine Essence, it is *intrinsic* to God. Thomas concludes his position with the opinion that not every creature has its own specific idea in God; Bonaventure disagrees: each and every creature has its own idea in the Godhead and it is according to this idea that God creates all things as imitations of Himself. As a result, He is reflected in the whole and in each part of the contingent world.

THE FRANCISCAN PERSPECTIVE:

St. Bonaventure's perspective of the world is a source of boundless joy, for all things contain in some degree the mark of God. He put into a theological system the magnificent vision of St. Francis: "What St. Francis lived, the Seraphic Doctor transforms into thoughts and ideas, analyzing them, clarifying them, and formulating them into a system and method."[22]

Thomas of Celano records that St. Francis saw the whole world "as a most clear mirror of goodness."[23] St. Bonaventure proves that "the creation of the world is a kind of book in which the Trinity shines forth, is represented and read as the Creator of the universe in three degrees of expression; namely, in the degree of vestige, image, and similitude."[24] St. Francis, Celano says, "made of all things a ladder to reach the royal throne." St. Bonaventure, because he proved the proper, objective, and distinct pre-existence of each creature in the eternal ideas, was able to show a specific harmony between the sign—the creature—and the thing signified—the Truine God: "Thus, the human intellect, as if by certain steplike levels, is born to ascend by gradations to the Supreme Principle which

[18] St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles,* I, c. 31. Emphasis added.

[19] *Ibid.,* c. 54.

[20] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* I, q. 15, a. 2 ad. 3.

[21] "The exemplary likeness expresses the things more perfectly than the caused thing itself expresses itself. Thus God knows things more perfectly through their model than He could know them through their essences . . . hence, I will see myself better in God than in my own self." *De Scientia Christi,* q. 2, ad. 9; *Opera Omnia,* V, 10a. Also confer *Collationes in Hexaemeron,* coll. 12, n. 9; *Opera Omnia,* V, 386a.

[22] Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., *op. cit.,* "Introduction," p. 15.

[23] Thomas of Celano, *Vita secunda S. Francisi,* (Quaracchi, Florence, 1926), II, c. 124, p. 226.

[24] *Breviloquium,* II, c. 12; *Opera Omnia,* V, 230a.

is God."[25] Celano further relates that to St. Francis "all things were good and cried out, 'the One Who made us is The Good par excellence." St. Bonaventure proved the existence of a universal analogy between all creation and God. Thus, all things spoke to him of their Uncreated Cause, the most Blessed Trinity:

> Therefore, whoever is not enlightened by such great splendor in created things is blind; whoever remains unheedful of such great outcries is deaf; whoever does not praise God in all these effects is dumb; whoever does not turn to the First Principle after so many signs is a fool. Open your eyes, therefore; alert the ears of your spirit, unlock your lips, and apply your heart that you may see, hear, praise, love and adore, magnify and honor your God in every creature, lest perchance the entire universe rise against you.[26]

For St. Bonaventure the uncreated life of the divine Trinity is in some way unravelled before the mind's eye with each new insight into created reality. Thus each created thing has a profound value in that it gives to the unprejudiced spectator a knowledge of the Divine Model Who is everywhere expressing and communicating Himself. This Franciscan vision of reality is, in fact, very simple: it is the acceptance of the goodness, truth, and beauty present in all being for the explicit purpose of leading us to a knowledge and love of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; it is the supreme adventure of the soul, the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum.*

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., *op. cit.*, "Text with Translation," c. 1, n. 15, pp. 48-49.

PRAYER OF SAINT FRANCIS OF ASSISI

Lord, make me an instrument
of your peace.
Where there is hatred, let me
sow love;
where there is injury, pardon;
where there is doubt, faith;
where there is despair, hope;
where there is darkness, light;
and where there is sadness, joy.

O Divine Master, grant
that I may not so much seek
to be consoled as to console;
to be understood as to understand;
to be loved as to love; for it is
in giving that we receive;
it is in pardoning that we are
pardoned;
and it is in dying that we are
born to eternal life.

THE OXFORD MOVEMENT AND THE ANGLICAN ANOMALY

by CONRAD L. HARKINS, O.F.M.

A visitor to the Anglican Cathedral of SS. Peter and Paul in Washington is immediately confronted with an anomaly. The physical structure of the building, its interior furnishings, its magnificent works of art, seem to indicate that of all the separated Churches of Christendom, the Anglican must be that which is closest to Catholicism. Reflection, however, brings to mind that this is the same Church whose General Convention two years ago chose to ignore doctrine and enter intercommunion with the Church of South India, a hybrid formed by the fusion of four Anglican dioceses and the Methodist, Presbyterian, and Congregational Churches of the area.

Modern Anglicanism is the anomaly of an "almost Catholic" ritual built on a latitudinarian doctrinal foundation. According to the latitudinarian view, the Church is broad enough to admit a variety of doctrinal beliefs, even contradictory beliefs. For the historical roots of the contemporary Anglican contradiction, we must return 130 years to the Oxford Movement, for it was this crisis in the Church of England which has shaped its modern development.

What was the Oxford Movement? What resulted in the greatest ecumenical movement of the nineteenth century was at its inception an effort to maintain without corruption from liberal influences the doctrine of the Anglican Church.

It would be a classic understatement to say that liberalism is a very broad term. The liberalism against which the Oxford Movement was primarily directed was that rationalism in matters of doctrine which crept into the Church of England in the first decades of the nineteenth century. But liberalism also has a political significance. In the years following the Napoleonic Wars, it referred to the movement toward popular sovereignty which erupted in Europe and the Americas. Because the English Church had become virtually a department of state, the liberal movement in England was accompanied with an attack on the Church. Political liberalism thus became the occasion for the formation of the Oxford Movement.

The defense of the Church against the liberal attack on doctrine rendered necessary an analysis of the nature of the Anglican Church in order to find a basis for resistance. The analysis made by John Henry Newman, then an Anglican divine, produced what he believed at the time to constitute a sound doctrinal basis for Anglicanism. The rejection of Newman's solution by the Anglican Church destroyed the basis for resistance to doctrinal liberalism. Newman's subsequent discovery of the falsity of his own solution and the continued triumph of liberalism placed Newman and others on the path to Catholicism. The Anglican Church fell before the liberal onslaught. Meanwhile, however, ritualism had developed as a logical consequence of Newman's premises, and although these premises were rejected by Anglicanism, the consequences remained. Thus today the Anglican Church is externally "Catholic," and internally (doctrinally), latitudinarian.

Let us trace this development.

DOCTRINAL LIBERALISM

Newman defined liberalism in this way:

> Liberalism . . . is the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word.[1]

It is, in brief, the denial of the supernatural order, the reduction of the tenets of religion to those which reason alone can demonstrate. Faith is reduced to a mere name; it is no longer assent to a proposition on the authority of God revealing, but rather, assent because of the intrinsic truth of the proposition as seen by natural reason. The mind of man becomes the measure of God on the presupposition that no truth, not even God Himself, can be greater than the comprehensive power of human reason.

In Newman's *Apologia,* the former leader of the Oxford Movement gave what he believed at the time to constitute the premises of the Anglican liberal party of 1830-40. Among them we find:

> No religious tenet is important, unless reason shows it to be so. No one can believe what he does not understand. No theological opinion is any thing more than an opinion which happens to be held by bodies of men.
>
> Christianity is necessarily modified by the growth of civilization, and the exigencies of times.[2]

The citation of just a few of these premises shows that the liberal philosophy would destroy the very basis of Christianity. Yet such were the doctrines subscribed to at this time by Anglican divines like Richard Whately, Thomas Arnold, and R. D. Hampden, the "Noetics" of Oxford, so called because of the deification of the *nous* over all authority.

[1] John Henery Newman, *Apologia pro Vita Sua.* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947), p. 261.

[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 266-67.

Dr. Whately was a fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, and in 1831 became Archbishop of Dublin. He urged the revision of the professions of faith by the removal of all doctrine which could not be proved from reason. While still at Oxford, Whately had as one of his disciples John Henry Newman, and the latter himself tells us that until 1827, "I was drifting in the direction of the Liberalism of the day."[3] Dr. Arnold, also a fellow of Oriel, wished to unite all the Protestant churches of England under the protection of the state. Union would be achieved above the doctrinal level; even the Trinity and Incarnation were not to be considered essential. Newman once asked of Arnold, "But is *he* a Christian?"[4] Of Hampden we shall speak later, for he is as representative of the liberal triumph as Newman is of the failure of orthodoxy.

It was this "halfway house to Atheism,"[5] as Newman described liberalism, against which the Oxford Movement was directed. The Movement failed, and Whately, Arnold, and Hampden are the founders of latitudinarian Anglicanism, known today as the Broad Church.[6]

But if it was doctrinal liberalism against which the Movement was directed, it was the liberal political movement of the day which triggered its formation. To understand how this is so, we must first have some concept of the political scene in the early nineteenth century.

POLITICAL LIBERALISM

Political liberalism grew from the "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" of the French Revolution and aimed at the transference of political power from the absolute monarch to the populace. The dissemination of these ideas through French agents and the decree of the French legislature promising aid to all peoples who would undertake rebellion, brought the nations of Europe into war against France in the last decade of

the eighteenth century. The ideas behind the French Revolution at first found favor in an England which, since its own bloodless Revolution of 1689, had developed into a constitutional monarchy. It was Edmund Burke who changed the mind of the nation with his *Reflections on the French Revolution,* and under the prime ministry of William Pitt a policy of repression began against the liberal ideas emanating from France. This policy was continued at the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 as England faced a severe economic crisis and possible rebellion.

A similar policy of repression was enforced throughout Europe as the statesmen at the Congress of Vienna endeavored to restore the absolutist governments of 1789. In the years that followed, Austria, Russia, and Prussia extinguished revolts in Naples, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. It was the revolt in Spain which gave the world the terms "liberal" and "liberalism" in the designation of the party which sought a return to the democratic constitution of 1812.[7]

Neither on the continent nor in England could the movement be halted. It had been pushed under the surface, but the surface was cracking under the seething pressures of popular unrest. The spirit of the French Revolution was again afoot in Europe. It was the spirit of "a secular liberalism which looked to a millenium based on the spirit-denying Philistine proposition that to make men perfect is no part of mankind's objective, but to make imperfect men comfortable."[8] Louis-Philippe had taken the throne of France as the "Citizen King"; revolts were succeeding in Greece, Italy, and Poland; Bolivar was on the march in South America; Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico were independent. Western Civilization was in a ferment. In England also the tide could not be stopped, for the English government might be splendidly isolationist, but the English people were not asleep to events in Europe. Archconservative Tories gave way to liberal Tories, and reform legislation began to be enacted.

It was in the last two years of the 1820's that the reform legislation took on a dangerous perspective to the Anglican Church. In 1828 the Test and Corporation Acts, which prevented non-Anglican Protestants from sitting in Parliament, were repealed. The following year the Duke of Wellington and Robert Peel, although opposed to Catholic Emancipation on principle, forced the bill through Parliament to avoid revolt in a defiant Ireland—defiant because it had ignored the law and elected to Parliament, a Catholic, Daniel O'Connell.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 184.

[6] The Anglican Church in the 1830's was composed of two main factions: High Church, which advocated the Catholicism of the first five centuries of Christianity, and Low or Evangelical Church, which held for a mitigated Calvinism. To these two groups must be added the Latitudinarian or Broad Church, which has emerged from the liberals, against which the Oxford Movement was directed. Newman belonged first to the Low Church; under Whately's influence he entered the Broad Church; and finally, under Keble's influence, he moved to the High Church faction. For a concise treatment of the development of High and Low Church, see Georges Tavard, "The Anglican Crossroads," in *Protestantism,* Vol. 137 of *Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Catholicism,* ed. by Henri Daniel-Rops (150 vols.; New York: Hawthorn, 1959).

[7] Don Luigi Sturzo, *Church and State* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939), p. 400.

[8] Charles Frederick Harrold, "The Oxford Movement: A Reconsideration," in *The Reinterpretation of Victorian Literature,* ed. by Joseph E. Baker (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 36.

The danger posited to the Anglican Church by the passage of these two bills becomes immediately clear when we consider the relationship which existed between the Church and the British government. The Anglican Church was truly a national church. By act of Parliament in 1534, the monarch had been established as the supreme head of the Church. In 1559 the principle of royal supremacy had been guaranteed when the right of appeal from ecclesiastical courts to the King in Chancery was established. However, the union of Church and state was not simply a matter of jurisdiction. Dawson points out: "Its [the Anglican Church's] relation to the State was not a matter of external policy and organization, it was an almost sacramental bond which moulded the inner life and spiritual ethos of the community."[9]

During the reign of the Stewarts, not only was there unity of Church and State, but the King was considered to rule by divine right. This tradition is manifest in the identification of national holidays and ecclesiastical feasts, e.g. the Feast of the Execution of King Charles the Martyr, the feast of the Restoration of the Royal Family. With the passage of these two bills, the question was raised: "What would the Royal Supremacy mean if Parliament was no longer exclusively Anglican?"[10] How could the state Church be Anglican if the state was not Anglican? The Anglican Church, subservient to the state, was now to be subservient to a state no longer exclusively Anglican. Might, as Newman feared, the English Church become, indeed, only a department of state?

Three events in the year 1830 prepared the way for the triumph of political liberalism in England. The accession of William IV called for an election. In July the house of Bourbon fell in France, and across the channel popular enthusiasm called for reform of Parliament. Discontent with the system of representation was rampant, and when the Duke of Wellington spoke of the British electoral system as so excellent as almost to be beyond the power of human nature in its perfection, opposition swelled and the Whigs returned to power for the first time since 1782. A Whig cabinet headed by Earl Grey obtained, over the vehement opposition of the House of Lords, the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832 providing for a much needed revision of the electoral system and the extension of the franchise. Because the House of Lords was composed of Lords temporal and Lords spiritual, the Anglican Church fell victim to the bitter opposition of the people. The Archbishop of Canterbury was threatened in his cathedral, the Bishop of Lichfield was attacked, the episcopal palace at Bristol was destroyed by a mob.

Reform of Parliament was followed by reform of the Church. Earl Grey "told the bishops to set their house in order."[11] The appeal from Church courts to the King in Chancery was transferred to a committee of the privy council, the members of which could be laymen. In an effort to relieve the financial burden of Irish Catholics, who were forced to support with taxes the Anglican Church of Ireland, ten Anglican sees in Ireland were suppressed. Though the Church of Ireland was described as a Church "of bishops without clergy, churches without clergymen, and clergymen without churches,"[12] to members of the Anglican Church, this was the beginning of persecution. On July 14, 1833, John Keble preached his famous assize sermon, "National Apostasy," in the university pulpit at Oxford. In the words of John Henry Newman, "I have ever considered and kept the day, as the start of the religious movement of 1833."[13]

A REACTION: THE OXFORD MOVEMENT

John Henry Newman had returned from Europe only a few days before Keble's sermon. He found that already a group of high churchmen were meeting "in opposition to the specific danger which at that time was threatening the religion of the nation and its Church."[14] The most outstanding of these men, with whom Newman at once united himself, were, in addition to Keble, Hurrell Froude, William Palmer, Arthur Perceval, and Hugh Rose. The specific danger was the spirit of liberalism attacking the Church from within, in the incipient Broad Church of Whately and Arnold, and the political liberalism which had produced "national apostasy." A third liberalizing tendency resulted from the promotion of Low Church or Evangelical Anglicans to high positions in the Church. To Newman it seemed that the Low Church had lost its "simplicity and unworldliness"[15] and to have played into the hands of the liberals.

The common element seems to have been the secularization of society. Revelation must fall before the march of reason; the civil arm which once upheld the Church was now choking off its life; a national doctrine was to count before a Christian doctrine. "The real religious issue before the world," says Christopher Dawson, "was not whether High Church or Low Church views should prevail in the Church of England, but whether the Christian religion should preserve its spiritual identity or whether it should be transformed by the spirit of the age and absorbed into the secularized culture of the modern world."[16]

The six churchmen met at the Hadleigh rectory of Hugh James Rose in mid-July. In their opposition to liberalism the men were one, but they differed in their ideas of how it should be combatted. Rose, "the man above all other fitted by his cast of mind and literary powers to make a stand,"[17] had founded the *British Magazine* the previous year as an organ of opinion against the liberal menace. William Palmer opposed the irresponsible actions of individuals (New-

[9] Christopher Dawson, *The Spirit of the Oxford Movement.* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1933), p. 6.

[10] William Barry, "Oxford Movement," *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: Encyclopedia Press, 1913), XI, 371.

[11] Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

[12] Cited by W. E. Lunt, *History of England* (4th ed.; New York: Harper, 1956), p. 649.

[13] Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[16] Dawson, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-33.

[17] Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

man and the tractarians),[18] and sought a "board of safe, sound, sensible men,"[19] an Association of Friends of the Church. Arthur Perceval was of the same mind as Palmer in his early opposition to Newman's *Tracts*. Hurrell Froude was the most dynamic of all the members.

> With Froude, Erastianism,—that is, the union (so he viewed it) of Church and State,—was the parent, or if not the parent, the serviceable and sufficient tool of liberalism. Till that union was snapped, Christian doctrine never could be safe.[20]

His proposals were so radical that he shocked Rose, Palmer, and Perceval. It was not the Act of Supremacy he wished to abolish; rather he would cut the ground out from under it by a repeal of *Praemunire*.[21] The "true and primary author"[22] of the Oxford Movement was John Keble. According to Newman, it was Keble who in the early years, at Oxford, turned the tide against liberalism and for the "old theology." Newman in one sentence tells us his attitude toward liberalism: "What he hated instinctively was heresy, insubordination, resistance to things established, claims of independence, disloyalty, innovation, a critical, censorious spirit."[23]

But if it was Keble who first stirred Oxford, it was Newman who stirred the Church of England. He set to work with a holy zeal to work a second reformation in the Anglican Church. Those who spoke about the irresponsible actions of individuals, he reminded that Luther had been an individual.[24] For Newman, liberalism could only be combatted on a doctrinal basis. From his Evangelical days he had imbibed a deep respect for the supernatural character of Christianity, and by Keble he was won to belief in the sacramental system. The supernatural order, supernatural life, grace, a visible Church, sacraments and rites which were channels of invisible grace, divine revelation—these were realities which must be defended against the attack of naturalism. "What gave Newman his unique power as the head of the Oxford Movement and reform of the Anglican Church was that he was . . . the teacher of a theology of grace."[25] But on what basis could this revelation be safeguarded if the Anglican Church were only a department of state for religious affairs? And on what could the authority of the Church rest if the state deserted her? These were the questions John Henry Newman set himself to answer.

Newman's study of the Fathers and of the seventeenth century Anglican divines convinced him that the basis of the Church's authority was the apostolic succession. This was the essential message which Newman and the other members of the Movement broadcast to the Anglican Church. This was Newman's message in 1833 when he began to canvass the parishes of England and in the articles he wrote for the Anglican periodicals. It was this message which was proclaimed in the first of two *Tracts for the Times,* the theological tracts which first appeared in 1833 and were to remain the principal organs of the movement until their termination in 1841. At the end of the first year, Dr. Edward Bouverie Pusey, Regius Professor of Hebrew at Oxford and Canon of Christ Church, joined the Movement "to give a name, a form, and a personality to what was without him a sort of mob."[26] The prestige of Pusey gave status to the Oxford Movement, and under his guidance the tracts became serious and lengthy theological treatises.

DOCTRINAL BASIS

The Oxford Movement was thus endeavoring to defend the Anglican Church from liberalism on a doctrinal basis, and the rock of this basis was the apostolic succession. This produced an attack from two sources: Catholicism, and the Evangelical Anglicans who accused the tractarians of "popery." The attack necessitated an analysis of the position of the Anglican Church vis a vis Protestantism and Catholicism. The fruit of Newman's analysis is the so-called *Via Media* of Anglicanism.

In essence, this doctrine was that the Anglican Church stood midway between the errors of the Roman Church, which had added to the doctrine of the Church of the Fathers, and Protestantism, which had subtracted from Christian doctrine. The "Catholic," as distinct from the "Roman" Church was one; but it had three branches, Greek, Latin, and Anglican. Each of the branches possessed the Church *in solidum,* and each branch was identical with the undivided Church of the Fathers. Essentially the doctrine of each of the three branches was identical; it was only necessary to purge the branches of later accidental errors. In Anglicanism was to be found the purest expression of the early faith of the Church. Newman offered this theory to the Church of England as a tentative basis on which to erect a theological system. He recognized that "even if the *Via Media* were ever so positive a religious system, it was not as yet objective and real . . . it was at present a paper religion."[27]

The *Via Media* gave rise to a further problem, which produced the crisis. If the doctrine of the Roman Church were *essentially* correct, how could the tractarians continue to subscribe to the Anglican *Credo,* the *Thirty-nine Articles?* This question, Newman attempted to answer in *Tract 90.* He tells us the nature of the tract:

> The main thesis then of my Essay was this: the Articles do not oppose Catholic teaching; they but partially oppose Roman dogma; they for the most part oppose the dominant errors of Rome. And the problem was to draw the line as to what they allowed and what they condemned.[28]

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[21] *Praemunire* is the name given to several statutes dating from the fourteenth century reigns of Edward III and Richard II. Intended to curb papal jurisdiction, they also increased the power of the crown. It was nominally because of the violation of the statute of 1393 that Cardinal Wolsey was punished by Henry VIII.

[22] Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 263.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[25] Dawson, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

[26] Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

By "Catholic teaching" he meant the teaching of the first centuries; "Roman dogma" meant the teaching of the later Councils; and the "dominant errors" were the actual popular beliefs and practices approved by Rome. The Tract was to test how far the *Articles* could be said to admit of a Catholic interpretation.

The Tract was published on February 27, 1841. Immediately throughout England the words "Newman" and "traitor" became synonymous. The hebdomadal board of Oxford posted notices that the statements of Newman "defeat the object and are inconsistent with the due observance of the . . . statutes."[29] The bishops wished him to withdraw the Tract, but Newman refused, agreeing only not to defend it on condition that it not be condemned. The agreement made, Newman terminated the *Tracts,* severed his connections with the Oxford Movement, and retired to Littlemore.

How great a part was played in these events by the liberal Anglican party is clearly indicated by Newman:

> It is surely a matter of historical fact that I left Oxford upon the University proceedings of 1841; and in those proceedings, whether we look to the Heads of Houses or the resident Masters, the leaders, if intellect and influence make men such, were members of the Liberal party. Those who did not lead, concurred or acquiesced in them,—I may say, felt a satisfaction. I do not recollect any Liberal who was on my side on that occasion. Excepting the Liberal, no other party, as a party, acted against me.[30]

In the few years that followed, Newman went through a spiritual crisis comparable, perhaps, only to that endured by St. Augustine. A series of events utterly destroyed his faith in the *Via Media* and Anglicanism, preparing the way for his conversion to Catholicism, October 9, 1845. What is striking is that these same events heralded the liberal triumph in Anglicanism. First, he discovered his own *Via Media* to be that of the admittedly heretical semi-Arians. Secondly, one by one the bishops condemned his position in *Tract 90.* Now it was precisely the doctrine of the *Via Media* which Newman had considered the necessary foundation for the bulwark against liberalism, and *Tract 90* was nothing more than a defense of the *Via Media,* while preserving the *Thirty-Nine Articles.* To destroy the *Via Media* was to open the door to liberalism. Thirdly, in 1841 an Anglican See was erected in Jerusalem to have jurisdiction over Lutherans, Druses, and other sects heretical from the High Anglican viewpoint. For Newman it was the triumph of liberalism, for doctrine was overlooked in the union. The Church of England became to Newman, a department of state.

On February 13, 1835, a later member of the Oxford Movement, William G. Ward, whose *Ideal of a Christian Church* favorably compared the Roman Church and unfavorably compared the Anglican Church to the Church of Christ, was deprived of his University position. The *Ideal* itself was censured. This was the death knoll of the Oxford Movement and signalled the beginning of a wave of conversions.

With the Tractarians gone, the bulwark was down. How much this is true is shown by the case of Dr. Hampden. Hampden had become Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford in 1836 due to the influence of his fellow liberal, Dr. Whately. In May of the same year he was censured by the governing board of Oxford for his "Bampton Lectures". Hampden's idea of doctrinal development was akin to that of the Modernists. It was Newman who was principally responsible for the censure of Hampden, but the Evangelical Anglicans who voted the censure expressed their desire that if they travelled to Oxford again, it might be to crush the "popery" of the Oxford Movement. Two years after the failure of the Movement, Hampden became Bishop of Hereford. The same year a Calvinist was given a benefice at Brampton Speke. The bishop objected; but the lay judicial committee overruled the bishop. Political liberalism had triumphed; the populace, not the bishops, would govern the Church. Doctrinal liberalism had triumphed; it had expelled Newman, and it had its own bishops.

THE ANOMALY

The liberal ascendancy has never ceased. At the end of the century, it made an unsuccessful effort to suppress the Athanasian Creed. In 1898 the liberal organ, *Churchman's Union* began its rationalistic attack on the Nicene Creed and the Apostles' Creed. The Convocation in 1905 adhered to the Creeds, but refused to take disciplinary action against the heretics. How far liberalism influenced the Anglican Church in the first decades of the twentieth century should be clear from a statement made in 1938 by a commission established to study the faith of the Church of England: ". . . to become bitter in controversy is more heretical than to espouse with sincerity and charity the most devastating theological opinions."[31] This is the latitudinarian view of modern Anglicanism, the fruit of which was made manifest in 1958 when the Lambeth Conference and the General Convention of American Episcopalians approved intercommunion with the Church of South India, as mentioned in our opening remarks.

It would be erroneous, however, to suppose that every voice in favor of orthodoxy has been stilled in the Anglican Church and its affiliated bodies. Spanning the years since the conversion of Newman, there has been and is now a group of Anglo-Catholics adhering to the doctrinal principles for which the Oxford Movement fought. In this group are such theologians as L. S. Thornton, E. L. Mascall, Austin Farrer, and the late Gregory Dix. For a time it appeared that the multicolored fabric of Anglicanism would be rent by the Church of South India issue. Opposition to intercommunion was vociferous on the part of the Annunciation Group in England and the American Church Union. The late Episcopal Bishop of Chicago, Dr. Conkling, strongly opposed the union. The Anglo-Catholic movement has been severely repressed, how-

[29] Cited by Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

[30] Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

[31] Cited by Humphrey J. T. Johnson in "Anglicanism in the Twentieth Century: II—Relaxation in Doctrinal Standards," *Clergy Review*, XXXIX (1952), p. 392.

ever, by the present Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Geoffrey F. Fisher, principal advocate of the intercommunion, perhaps as a step towards the formation of an all-embracing Protestant State Church of England. How successful the suppression has been, only time will tell. Since the approval of intercommunion, over thirty members of the Anglican clergy have abandoned communion with the See of Canterbury for communion with the See of Peter.

The ritualism of modern Anglicanism is a by-product of the Oxford Movement. In 1833 eucharistic vestments were unknown in England, and copes were seen only at coronations. In 1842 the surplice was enjoined on the clergy of London, and seven years later the chasuble appeared at Oxford for the first time since Elizabeth I. The Oxford Movement had awakened an appreciation for the ritual of Catholicism. At Cambridge University, the Camden Society was dedicated to the restoration of churches. The romantic movement awakened an interest in the pre-Reformation culture of what once was Mary's England. In disregard for a Public Worship Regulation Act, the use of palms was introduced, incense appeared, the Feasts of the Sacred Heart and the Assumption were celebrated. Prayers for the dead became popular during World War I. Finally, Mass was celebrated according to the Roman Canon, and the practice of reserving the Blessed Sacrament was introduced, although these practices have mostly vanished due to the efforts of Dr. Fisher as Bishop of London and later Archbishop of Canterbury, and his immediate predecessor at London, Winnington-Ingram.

Christopher Dawson has said of the Oxford Movement: "It stood above all for the preservation of the spiritual identity of Christianity, and represents an attempt to restore the Catholic conception of an objective supernatural order and the Catholic idea of divine authority within the boundaries of the Established Church of Protestant England."[32] Unfortunately, to High Church Anglicans, the Movement communicated only its by-product of vestments, incense, and chant; for except among the relatively few Anglo-Catholics, doctrinal liberalism has captured the Church. For John Henry Newman dogma stood at the heart of religion, and religious practices flowed from this heart and returned to it. It is the failure to grasp this essential relationship between the *lex orandi* and the *lex credendi* which is the crux of the Anglican anomaly.

[32] Dawson, *op. cit.*, p. 133.



ST. LAWRENCE OF BRINDISI:
Doctor Ecclesiae

by BLAINE BURKEY, O.F.M.CAP.

Frater Blaine is a cleric at Capuchin College, Washington. His contribution to INTEREST is welcomed as another indication of the Franciscan family-spirit.

St. Lawrence of Brindisi, O.F.M.Cap. (d.1619) was a light "hidden under a bushel." This was true when Frederick Cardinal Borromeo first said it in 1626. It was true up to our own day. But on March 19, 1959, Pope John XXIII removed the bushel, and placed Lawrence on the many-branched lamp-stand of the Doctors of the Church. Passing over reasons that kept Lawrence hidden so long, we will outline Pope John's reasons for placing this "shining beacon of learning and sanctity" (Pius XI) on the honor roll of the Doctors of the church.

Cardinal Lambertini (later Pope Benedict XIV) lays down three requisites for a Doctor of the Church: eminent *holiness,* eminent *learning,* and an official *proclamation* by Pope or Council.[1] Quite logically, Pope John XXIII took the first and second of these requisites as reasons for positing the third in Lawrence's case. To these, he added a third reason: Lawrence's apostolic *zeal.*

The Pope indicates these at the beginning of his bull *Celsitudo ex humilitate.*[2] He writes that, just as Christ called the Apostles to sow the Gospel, "so he also called . . . (Lawrence) to enlighten the Church through his *holiness,* his powerful preaching [*zeal*], and prolific writing [*learning*]."

HOLINESS

The Holy Father notes that the first reason why Lawrence should be a Doctor is his holiness:

> Lawrence *taught* not only by word but also by his life. For he was a man in whom lofty virtues reached the heights attained only by the heroes in the Church . . . He actually displayed the singular virtues for which he was praised as the miracles of God prove.

Because of this holiness, Pope Pius VI beatified and Pope Leo XIII canonized Lawrence. They proposed him "to all Christians as an example to be imitated." [3]

ZEAL

John XXIII further discovered two things outstanding in Lawrence: "Apostolic zeal and mastery of doctrine." Lawrence's zeal he treats first. "After his ordination . . . , he immediately assumed the holy office of preaching and remained until his death an untiring herald of Jesus Christ." This was the apostolate of the spoken word, which Aquinas calls "the more noble way of teaching." [4] The Pope continues on the Apostolic Doctor's zeal:

> From the pulpit whether speaking of Christian dogma, of morals, Sacred Scripture, or the virtues of the saints, he excited Catholics to piety and moved those plunged in the mire of sin to wash away their stains and amend their lives . . . In assemblies of Jews and heretics, he stood as a standard bearer of the Roman Church and inspired many of them to leave and abjure their false beliefs.

The Pope also speaks of Lawrence's work for the Church as a diplomat and as a superior in the Order.

LEARNING

This finished, he proceeds to the Saint's "veritable treasures of wisdom," his 15-volume *Opera Omnia.* First he marvels at Lawrence's prolific output "on all subjects, especially since he hardly ever relaxed from the rigors of preaching and the apostolic life."

In noting the learning of these works, the Pope singles out Lawrence's particular competences. Since Doctors do not all enjoy the same degree or manner of authority, the range and depth of their authority are generally set forth in the decree naming them Doc-

[1] *De canoniz.* IV, 2, 11-12.

[2] *AAS* 51 (1959) 456-61. Translated by Carl Quinn, O.F.M. Cap. Italics mine.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *ST* III, 42, 4.

tors.[5] St. Alphonsus' particular competence, we know, is as moralist; St. Jerome's, as Scripture scholar; St. Robert Bellarmine's, as apologist. In St. Lawrence's case, John XXIII enumerates three competences: as *Scripture scholar,* as *Mariologist,* as *Apologist.*

Scripture Scholar

Lawrence's only extant work devoted entirely to Biblical exegesis covers Genesis I-XI. His Holiness writes of it:

> Especially pleasing to us is the book entitled *Explanatio in Genesim* in which Lawrence, employing the doctrine of the Jewish masters, the Fathers of the Church, and that of the schoolmen, examines the divine truth, and, as a most severe judge, passes judgment on various opinions and controversies.

The Holy Father is not alone in his admiration of this work. Fr. Vaccari, S.J., asserts that Lawrence "outstandingly fulfills the role of an interpretor." [6] Fr. Vosté, O.P., confidently states "that it [this commentary] should be numbered among the greater and more learned of its time. It contains an unusual understanding of philology, literary erudition, and knowledge of philosophy and theology."[7] Canon Ricciotti writes:

> We regard it as one of the most solid and accurate Commentaries, not only of its time, but of about two centuries . . . St. Lawrence is an illustrious representative of the highest level of the Catholic Biblical exegesis of his time.[8]

These testimonies, in effect, put Lawrence in a class with the famous tomes of Maldonatus, Salmeron, Toletus, Bonfrère, Estius, Lapide—to name only a few.

Even more interesting are the encomiums of Jewish scholars. Rabbi Umberto Cassuto wrote in a private letter:

> The Hebrew learning of St. Lawrence was truly extraordinary. He was familiar not only with the OT Hebrew text and its Judaeo-Aramaic versions (Targumim), but also with the medieval Hebrew commentaries, which he cites often and interprets, even in their most difficult passages, with masterly sureness and precision.[9]

Prof. Israele Zolli, at the time head Rabbi of Rome, added that "in many ways he is a real forerunner . . . (of modern exegesis)." [10]

Exegesis is also found throughout Lawrence's 11 volumes of sermons. These contain more than 90,000 Scriptural citations. "All of which," the Pope comments, "poured forth as from a mighty river." Lawrence used the Bible text with such art that it came as the natural expression of his thought. It never has the appearance of being dragged in.

Mariologist

The Holy Father next turned to Lawrence's 86 Marian sermons:

> We must praise especially his *Mariale* which contains the complete doctrine about the Mother of God. In it he discusses with great wisdom and marvelous tenderness the manifold arguments and assertions of this study. He even anticipates those doctrines which our immortal predecessors Pius IX and Pius XII defined . . .

Lawrence defends Mary's Divine Motherhood, her Immaculate Conception and glorious Assumption, her cooperation in redemption and universal mediation and her Queenship of the Universe. As a kind of crown to all these prerogatives he wisely defends the Absolute Primacy of Christ and Mary. Each in turn he defends with arguments that have scarcely even been improved upon. No wonder Fr. Vollert, S.J., marvelled that Lawrence was most modern in his Mariology. No wonder Msgr. Campana said: "Few have spoken of the Madonna as well as St. Lawrence and none better." [11] No wonder Fr. Roschini, O.S.M., wrote: "St. Lawrence . . . is worthy to be counted among the most important Mariologists of his age." [12] When the *Mariale* appeared in 1928, theologians wondered how such a treasure could have so long remained hidden. The Capuchin Minister General does not hesitate to say: "His *Mariale* is truly a Marian poem, the most beautiful I should say, and the most comprehensive ever written these two thousand years since the beginning of the Christian era." [13]

Apologist

In pointing out Lawrence's third competence, the Pope becomes even more forceful:

> In three volumes entitled *Lutheranismi Hypotyposis,* Lawrence, as a defender of Catholic law, uses the finest erudition to draw the people from the errors disseminated by heretical teachers. Therefore, those who teach theology and especially those who explain and defend Catholic doc-

[5] A. Cotter, S.J., "Doctors of the Church," *New Cath. Dict.* (N.Y., 1929), p. 303.

[6] *Verbum Domini* 16 (1936) 320*-320**.

[7] *Angelicum* 13 (1936) 132-3.

[8] *Avvenire d'Italia* 10 Oct. 1935.

[9] *Ir. Eccl. Rev.* 92 (1959) 56.

[10] *Round Table Fran. Research* 12 (1946) 23.

[11] Letter of June 23, 1935. In: Arch. O.F.M.Cap. Prov. Venice.

[12] *Osservatore Romano,* 1 Mart. 1934.

[13] Clement of Milwaukee, (Circular letter on St. Lawrence), 4-16-1959, in *AOFMCap* 75 (1959) 79-86.

CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL OF THE PACIFIC LIBRARY

trine have a work with which they can nourish their minds and equip themselves for protecting and relishing the truth and thus prepare themselves for leading others to salvation. If they follow this man who dispelled errors, explained obscurities, and solved doubts, they may be sure that they follow a secure path.

The scholarship of the *Hypotyposis* commands admiration. Lawrence thoroughly acquainted himself with his opponents. He read all Luther's German and Latin works in the Jena and Wittenberg editions. Also the principal works of Lutheran and anti-Lutheran literature.

Some contend that these three volumes are St. Lawrence's most important contribution to theology. They contain the greater part of his teaching, at least on matters such as Justification, the Church and the Sacraments.

Fr. Spedalieri, S.J., writes that as an apologist of the Christian Faith, St. Lawrence shines with no less splendor than the two great Jesuit apologists and contemporaries of his, also Doctors of the Church, SS. Peter Canisius and Robert Bellarmine.[14]

WHY NOW?

Thus far, we have pondered the causes for Lawrence's being named a Doctor. Why did Providence pick this particular age to put Lawrence in the spot light?

Already in 1783, Pope Pius VI said:

> As Innocent III beheld . . . St. Francis upholding the Church, We pray that . . . (Lawrence) who faithfully imitated the glorious Patriarch, may in like manner, defend the Church, continually exposed to persecution, with the same zeal which during life, he displayed for the Catholic Faith.[15]

This was Pius' reason for beatifying Lawrence.

In 1881, Pope Leo XIII said:

> In raising to the honors of the altars this great Franciscan, we are comforted by the hope that, through his aid, nations and princes, may listen to the voice of the Church, We pray that . . . (Lawrence) who faithfully escape the dangers that menace them with irreparable ruin.[16]

Again in 1960, this was Pope John XXIII's reason for making Lawrence a Doctor of the Church in our day. He writes:

> "How inestimable is this loving kindness" (Easter *Exultet*) of Christ that he has never let himself be separated from his Spouse and has always provided suitable remedies for the evils oppressing his Church. When the senseless rage of the reformers flared up and threatened the Catholic cause with persistant assaults, when the faith of many was waning and morality was sinking low, he inspired Lawrence to defend what was attacked, to reclaim what had been lost, and to promote what was conducive to the salvation of all.
>
> Now, at a time when infectious diseases are rampant and men are being trapped by false teachings and all sorts of corruption, it is again necessary that this man be placed in the spot light. It is expedient that Christians be encouraged to do good by the splendor of his virtue [*holiness*] and draw strength from the precepts of his salutary doctrine [*learning*].

It was God's will, then, that present-day society, infected by materialism, should be reminded of and again imbued with the teachings of St. Lawrence. These doctrines enabled him to strengthen the faith of his contemporaries, and to uncover heresies aimed at undermining the foundation of the Catholic faith, sound philosophy, and civic life. It is generally conceded that the errors infecting modern society—its theology, philosophy, sociology, and political and economic sciences—stem from the very heresies which Lawrence inveighed against with fiery pen and tongue at the turn of the 17th century. It is apparent that Lawrence can be called a man of our age in his *saintly* life and spirit, in his apostolic *zeal,* and in his *learned* writings, so replete with the fundamentals of genuine Catholic doctrine, which is ever able to put to flight all error and to confute the adversaries of truth. This is the reason for Lawrence's being made a Doctor in our day.

In the future, we may well find other indications of the timeliness of Lawrence's elevation. His stature will enrich our Marian Age,[17] and his apostolic zeal will offer inspiration to the coming Second Vatican Council.[18]

[14] *Gregorianum* 29 (1948) 307.

[15] A. Brennan, O.S.F.C., *St. Lawrence* . . . (London, 1911), p. 265.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 270.

[17] Cf. Clement of Milwaukee, *op. cit.*

[18] Cf. *Ibid.* and Damian Wheelock, O.F.M.Cap., "Doctor of Reunion," *AER* 143 (1960) 117-20.

CASE IN POINT: The Divine Office

by PHILIP J. MARTIN, O.F.M.

Q. Paul, a newly ordained secular priest, finds it becoming increasingly more difficult to say his Office because he has been assigned to an intensive program of higher studies, in addition to which he must help out at the parish where he resides. It is still early in the school term, and Paul is perplexed, knowing that the present situation will continue for quite a while. A friend has urged him to get dispensed from the recitation of the Office, but Paul, unsure of the principles which cover this situation, has let matters go from bad to worse. What can he do?

A. GENERAL NORMS

There are some general norms regarding the recitation of the Divine Office which are pertinent to this case: (a) One who cannot say the entire Office is bound *sub gravi* to say part of it, if reasonably possible and the character and purpose of the Office is preserved by the recitation of that part (e.g., one small hour, not just one psalm). (b) One legitimately excused from the Office is not bound to say other prayers in its place, except if the Office has been legitimately commuted to some other prayers or pious work. (c) One who cannot say the Office alone, but can say it with a companion, is bound to recite it with the companion if such can be done conveniently.[1]

EXCUSING CAUSES

How would Paul be excused from the Office? There are four classes of excusing causes: (1) physical inability; (2) illness; (3) occupation; (4) dispensation.[2]

1. *Physical inability.* One is clearly excused when he does not have a Breviary (e.g., on a trip) and cannot get another of one's own rite,[3] or if his eyesight is so bad that the Office can only be recited with great difficulty (e.g., one loses his glasses, has an eye infection). But if a notable part, equal to one small hour, can be recited from memory, then he is seriously bound to do so. One is not bound to add remembered parts from the various hours to reach a notable part.

2. *Illness* also excuses if the Office can be recited only with great difficulty or if there is reason to believe that the illness will increase from saying the Office. If one cannot say the whole Office, and doubts whether he can even say part, he is not bound to any of it. One who is convalescing, if he fears a relapse or notable fatigue, is not bound to the Office—even though he can do some other type of reading (e.g., the daily paper, a novel) for recreation or relaxation.

3. *Occupation* arising from one's duty or from charity, especially if extraordinary and unexpected, if it prevents one from saying the Divine Office and cannot be deferred without notable harm to oneself or to another, is an excusing cause. Such would be an unexpected sick-call at night, the preparation of a sermon which could not be done at some other time, an unusual amount of confessional duty that leaves little or no time for the Office, or need for necessary sleep or relaxation. This last mentioned is to be judged prudently, balancing the gravity of the obligation with the seriousness of the need (e.g., one of normal health could hardly omit the Office because he feels a nap might be pleasant or that he must get in his daily round of golf).[4] It is axiomatic that first things come first.

In all these cases there is always supposed an extraordinary occurrence or amount of work; for the ordinary labors of the day, even if they be great, are to be so ordered that one can say the Office of the day. If this be not possible, the reasonable solution is that the work be decreased or that one seek a dispensation or commutation. Not to seek a dispensation, especially if the omission of the Office is a continual occurrence, is a sin of negligence.[5] Due to the gravity of the obligation and the continuing neglect, this could quite probably be a serious sin.

4. *Dispensation.* The Holy See can dispense validly, even without a reasonable cause. Any other jurisdiction is delegated. For example, Apostolic Nuncios and Delegates have the faculty to commute the Divine Office for a reasonable cause.[6] Apart from a special indult, Ordinaries can dispense from the recitation of the Office in only three cases.

First, they can dispense when there is a doubt of fact regarding the need for dispensation and this in cases where the Holy See usually dispenses (c. 15; e.g., whether in this case the work is extraordinary enough of itself to excuse, whether a particular illness would in itself be sufficient to excuse). It should be noted that the Holy See rarely grants a dispensation from the recitation of the Office. The practice is to commute where it is necessary.

Secondly, Ordinaries may dispense if recourse to the Holy See is difficult and there is danger of grave harm in delay, in cases where the Holy See would customarily grant the dispensation (c. 81).

[1] Noldin-Schmitt, *Summa Theologiae Moralis* (Oeniponte: Rauch, 1936), II, n. 775.

[2] *Ibid.*, n. 774.

[3] Vermeersch, *Theologiae Moralis* (Rome: Gregorian University, 1927), III, n. 41, 1.

[4] Noldin-Schmitt, *op. cit.*, I, n. 186.

[5] *Ibid.*, II, n. 779, 2-3.

[6] Vermeersch, *op. cit.*, III, n. 41, 4; and canon 267.

Thirdly, Vermeersch-Creusen and others hold that *by custom* the local Ordinary can dispense for a short time for a reasonable cause.[7] Capello and Van Hove deny the validity of this custom due to c. 5, which speaks of the suppression of certain customs which existed up to the time of the Code,[8] but the former opinion seems to be solidly probable due to the authority of its adherents.

It should be noted that a confessor can forbid a penitent and a bishop or religious superior can forbid his subjects, to recite the Office because he is suffering from scrupulosity.[9] A confessor or pastor could counsel the priest that he is excused *de facto* from the nature of the case, but they cannot dispense him.

COMMUTATION

The power of commuting the Office is generally had by those who have the power to dispense. The same norms are to be followed as for dispensation.[10] As regards the Divine Office, commutation is much more common than dispensation: the common commutation being fifteen decades of the Rosary when recited alone, or five if recited with another.

By privilege, regular superiors and those who enjoy the privileges of regulars can commute the Office of their subjects who are engaged in preaching, hearing confessions, teaching or studying Sacred Scripture, Theology, or Canon Law, or who are sick or are caring for the sick. In its place they must impose the recitation of at least six or seven psalms, seven Our Fathers, and the Creed twice.[11]

THE CASE

What about Paul's situation? It is possible that on certain days he was excused due to over-work. But because of the norms regarding occupation, and since he sees that the situation will continue, Paul is bound either to regulate his day so as to say the Office or to seek a dispensation or commutation. It seems that a talk with his Ordinary or else the dropping of one course might solve his problem easily enough. Occupation *per se* would not excuse him over such a long period of time as a semester or two.

If this be practically impossible, which would appear to be a very rare situation, he may seek a dispensation or commutation from his bishop. If his Ordinary has the indult to grant such and deems the reason sufficient, then there is no complication.

What if the Ordinary does not have the indult? For a short time he may dispense Paul by reason of custom. The interpretation of this "short time" may vary, but it seems unlikely that it could extend to cover a whole school year, or even a semester.

It is possible that the Ordinary could dispense or, better, commute in virtue of c. 15 if he judges there is true doubt of fact about the sufficiency of the excusing cause, or in virtue of c. 81 if recourse to the Holy See is difficult in this particular case and there is danger of grave harm in delay. Finally, recourse may be had to the Apostolic Delegate or to the Holy See.

A priest who is studying—even taking intensive courses—and helping in a parish or doing any work, should make time for the recitation of the Divine Office. No doubt situations may arise that excuse from the obligation, but since the duty is there, and since it is the deputed task of the priest, it seems that his schedule should be so planned as to allow him time at least for this minimal prayer-life.

[7] Vermeersch-Creusen, *Epitome Iuris Canonici* (Rome: Dessain, 1949), I, n. 191. Also cf. Aertnys-Damen, *Theologia Moralis et Pastoralis* (Rome: Marietti, 1947), I, n. 1131, 2. As well cf. Tanquerey, *Synopsis Theologiae Moralis et Pastoralis* (Rome: Desclee, 1919), III, n. 1083.

[8] Capello, *Summa Iuris Canonici* (Rome: Gregorian University, 1945), I, n. 127, 8. Also cf. Van Hove, *De Privilegiis et Dispensationibus* (Rome: Dessain, 1939), n. 413.

[9] Aertnys-Damen, *op. cit.*, I, n. 1128.

[10] Zalba, *Theologiae Moralis Summa* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Auctores Cristianos, 1953), II, n. 145. Also cf. canons 1313 and 1314.

[11] Bonzelet-Mathis-Leahy, *The Pastoral Companion* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1956), pp. 389-390; see also Brady, *A Spiritual Commentary on the Rule of the Friars Minor,* Chapters I-III (Detroit: Duns Scotus College, *pro manuscripto,* no date), pp. 63-64, for list of other privileges for Friars Minor and those who communicate privileges with them. Schaefer, *De Religiosis* (Rome: Herder, ed. 3, 1940) n. 371, also mentions these privileges.

a) Friars Minor may say the Lay-Brothers' Office (seventy-six Our Fathers) in place of the Divine Office for any reasonable cause and without recourse to the superior or confessor.

b) Friars Minor, when they are infirm, may, without recourse to superior or confessor, say the Hail Mary seven times and the Our Father once in place of the Divine Office, or something else assigned by the Confessor.

c) Superiors may commute the Office of those caring for the sick to six or seven psalms, seven Pater Nosters, and two Apostles' Creeds.

d) For those who cannot carry a Breviary with them, the superior or confessor can commute the Office to a Rosary or other prayers.

e) For Friars engaged in any continual preaching, the Office can be commuted to other prayers or to the Little Office of the B.V.M.

Book Reviews

***La Primaute du Christ selon l'Ecriture et la Tradition* by Jean Francois Bonnefoy, O.F.M.; Rome: Herder, 1959; 467 pp., $8.00**

Christianity is by definition Christocentric. Christ is the Alpha, the Omega, and the Center of its theology, of its philosophy, and of its life. All this is implied in virtually every page of Scripture; it was so well understood by ancient and medieval Christendom that there was no need even to formulate an explicit teaching on the "Place of Christ in the Divine Plan."

But in the twelfth century, Robert of Dietz raised the question of whether Christ would have existed at all if it were not for Adam's sin. Other Scholastics treated the question too, and with few exceptions (e.g., Albert the Great), they answered it in the negative, basing themselves on St. Augustine's famous dictum that where there is no illness, no physician is needed.

It was two centuries after Robert's time, however, that the question was seen in its true light, as based on a mere hypothesis—and that St. Augustine's answer was seen to apply not to the Incarnation *simpliciter,* but to the Redemption. Duns Scotus reversed the question completely when he explained that God thought first of Christ, who would give Him a perfect return for His Love.

Not until our own day, however, was Scotus' answer fully appreciated as a principle which might unify Catholic theology so effectively as to revitalize its entire structure. And few, if any, theologians of our times have done more to develop and propagate this Scotistic teaching than Fr. Jean-F. Bonnefoy, O.F.M. (1897-1958). In fact, his greatest contribution to its cause may have been to show that it is not mere Scotistic teaching, but, in the words of Fr. H. M. Féret, O.P., "a datum of faith, prior to any particular theology and imposing itself on it."



Fr. Bonnefoy began his priestly life as a student of Sacred Scripture and went on to teach that subject for a while, until his interest was captured by the more speculative science of dogmatic theology. It is fitting, then, that this, his last work, is basically scriptural, but enriched with the mature and solid speculation of an internationally-known theologian.

Indeed, the experience gained from his years of teaching, from attending several major theological conventions, and from writing more than a dozen articles on the subject has made Fr. Bonnefoy uniquely qualified to write this work, which should almost certainly replace Fr. Risi's four-volume synthesis, *Sul motivo primario dell'Incarnazione* (Rome, 1898), both as an authoritative exegetical work and as a doctrinal exposition of the Primacy of Christ.

It is precisely this rare combination of exegesis and theology, however, which may discredit this book in the eyes of some Scripture scholars who are accustomed to the older, non-Christological interpretations of these texts. As Fr. Reginald C. Fuller has observed in his essay on hermeneutics, however, "The attitude of mind which instinctively regards with suspicion an interpretation merely because it is new should be avoided."

Now, Fr. Bonnefoy is not at all oblivious of the fact that his exegesis is not the common one currently accepted by Scripture scholars, and he does not mean to imply that it is. Indirectly, however, by the conclusive demonstrations of his Christological exegeses, Fr. Bonnefoy does show clearly the difficulties inherent in the more commonly accepted non-Christological interpretations of the texts he analyzes—e.g., those interpretations which make Wisdom refer to the human virtue, the essential Wisdom of God, or the Word precisely as uncreated.

While conceding unequivocally that simple linguistic exegesis will never yield the interpretation he has given, Fr. Bonnefoy rightly insists that linguistics are not enough to interpret a prophetical passage; he insists upon bringing all his vast theological knowledge to the task, and upon turning the powerful light of Tradition upon the somewhat obscure texts.

That is why, for example, he can translate the Hebrew *qanah* as *predestine,* whereas it means *acquire,* or *buy.* He does not mean to imply that *predestine* is the basic meaning of the word, but he shows quite clearly that *in this context* (Prov. 8:22), which has to do with God "acquiring" the Firstborn of every creature, there is no more accurate translation than *predestine.* It is important to note, however, that such assertions as these are never made on Fr. Bonnefoy's own authority; his book is put together in such a way that, while it is divided into exegeses of specific scriptural texts, yet Tradition is used abundantly in justifying each particular exegesis.

In other words, *LA PRIMAUTE DU CHRIST* is primarily the work of a theologian, rather than of a scripture scholar *qua talis.* This fact is made abundantly clear in the Introduction, where Fr. Bonnefoy gives the metaphysics and the theology of the Primacy. Before beginning the exegetical work, he explains, we must *know what we are seeking* in the Sacred Books. That is, he already knows the doctrine from theology, and he would like to show us the Scriptural basis for it. He is not so much

BOOKS RECEIVED

Live Your Vocation by Paulo Provera, C.M.; tr. Rev. Thomas Murray; Herder Co., 1959; 260 pp., $3.75

The Mystery of Mary by R. Bernard, O.P.; tr. M. A. Bouchard; Herder Co., 1960; 304 pp., $4.95

The Life of St. Thomas Aquinas by Kenelm Foster, O.P.; Helicon Press, 1959; 172 pp., $5.50

The Kingdom of Heaven in Parables by Franz M. Moschner; tr. David Heimann; Herder Co., 1960; 326 pp., $4.75

Christmas Every Christmas by Hubert M. Dunphy, O.F.M. Conv.; Bruce Co., 1960; 100 pp., $2.75

The Holy Spirit and the Art of Living by J. A. O'Driscoll, SM.; Herder Co., 1959; 126 pp., $2.35

proving it from Scripture, as deepening our understanding of it with Scriptural applications. It should be clear from the foregoing, however, that it would be wrong, on this basis, to accuse Fr. Bonnefoy of "reading Christ into the Old Testament." It is a sad thing indeed, as he himself notes, that there are Catholic exegetes who are afraid to find Christ in the Old Testament, whereas they should be seeking Him there. Moreover, the detailed analysis of the pertinent passages from Proverbs, Ecclesiasticus, Wisdom, Colossians, and Ephesians yields apodictic conclusions; the flawless logic for which Fr. Bonnefoy was so famous has not at all deserted him in the composition of this, his masterpiece. This is precisely why it does not seem reasonable to say, as Fr. C. Boyer did in a review of this book, that although Fr. Bonnefoy's findings are fine and useful, his conclusions are unacceptable. His conclusions, in fact, are none other than those of Scripture and Tradition: Christ is the Firstborn of every creature (a 40-page exegesis of the term *Firstborn* makes its meaning unmistakable), predestined from all eternity, independent of every other creature, to sovereign glory in the Hypostatic Union.

The book is divided into three main parts: an analysis of three Sapiential texts, an analysis of two Pauline texts, and a doctrinal synthesis which embodies the findings of the first two, positive, parts together with many *obiter dicta* which could not be included in those parts. As has already been observed, Tradition is not considered separately, but is brought to bear upon the various passages of Scripture as they are analyzed.

LA PRIMAUTE DU CHRIST is an important book, because it gives the basis in Scripture, in Tradition, and in theological reason for the doctrine which, more than any other, will serve as a unifying principle for all the positive, kerygmatic, Christ-centered work now being done by theologians throughout Western Christendom. Until an English translation is available, we heartily recommend the French original as a "must" for the library of any theological house of studies.

MICHAEL D. MEILACH, O.F.M.

***Liturgy and Contemplation* by Jacques and Raissa Maritain; tr. Joseph Evans; P. J. Kennedy & Sons, 1960; 96 pp., $2.95**

"The general theme of this study is that there is an intimate relationship between liturgy and contemplation" (p. 12). The Maritains endeavor to develop the words of Pius XII, that "no conflict exists . . . between the ascetical life and devotion to the liturgy." The opening chapters point to the fact that liturgy itself asks the soul to tend towards contemplation; otherwise it is mere formalism. This means that, if Catholic liturgy is to be safeguarded from externalism, the faithful should cultivate interior recollection by aspiring towards union with God and at the same time tend towards the perfection of Charity. In fact the former, contemplation, is a corollary of the latter, the perfection of Charity.

This idea is developed by showing that liturgy and contemplation are not two exclusive means that accidently meet for achieving our ultimate End—God. On the contrary, they are two realities united by the same beginning and the same end—Charity. Both liturgy and contemplation are directed towards God; they both flow from the same source—the recognition and the realization of God; and since God is Charity, they both begin and end in Charity. In other words, the liturgical life and the contemplative life are linked through the perfection of Charity. The problem to which the Maritains address themselves is the re-establishment of contemplation to its ordered place by forming a synthesis between liturgy and contemplation.

But have the Maritains offered a solution to this problem? There is a partial solution, not a complete one. They approach a solution to this problem by asserting the need and the value of contemplation. Although poetical at times, they convincingly show the necessity for contemplation. The concluding chapters dismiss the objections to a contemplative life by showing them to be superficial and untrue. However, the manner in which they clinch the rights and prerogatives of contemplation and the logic by which they denounce the 'pseudo-liturgists' create the defect and the controversy found in the book. They equate external worship with liturgical worship

and synthesize this (external worship) with infused contemplation. This erroneous idea of external worship persistently recurs in spite of their insistence on interior worship. The comparison leads to such conclusions as: "This contemplation of the Church . . . is clearly superior to the great liturgical voice which manifest it" (p. 20). "In what concerns individual souls, contemplation, to the extent that they attain it, is superior to the acts through which they take part in the divine service" (p. 21).

In fairness to the authors, these conclusions may result from their reaction to liturgists who stress the externals of the liturgy. But, why not fully evaluate the relation between contemplation that is private with contemplation that is liturgical, or the perfection of Charity through private worship with the perfection of Charity through public worship? Again, by not fully developing the notion of contemplation within the liturgy, they conclude that contemplation, whose form is the theological virtue of Charity, is superior to worship, whose form is the moral virtue of religion, because a theological virtue (in itself) is superior to a moral virtue (in itself). If stated this way, it is formally and materially true; however, if the theological virtue is combined with the moral virtue, so that Charity is perfected in the act of worship (this being true liturgical worship), it follows that Charity achieved through liturgical worship excels Charity achieved outside of liturgical worship. Charity is still Charity even if achieved through liturgical acts. In other words, the conclusion that liturgical contemplation is an end higher than private contemplation is not adequately treated in this book. The reason for this is simply that the Maritains equate external participation with liturgical worship.

Although they insist that the theological virtues must be exercised by those who participate in the liturgy, they do not fully explore this notion in their treatment of contemplation. For example, they state: "With the Carthusians . . . the Office chanted in common is of less importance than the Solitary Dialogue with God" (p. 94). Again, this leaves one with the impression that the liturgy consists only in prayers, lessons, hymns, and psalms—that is, only in external words, signs, and symbols.

In brief, the authors have aided in partially clarifying the relationship between liturgy and contemplation by bringing contemplation, its need, and its value, to the modern reader. Yet, they have not aided in forming a satisfactory solution by their ambiguous and confusing treatment of liturgy in relation to contemplation.

BONAVENTURE J. O'BRIEN, O.F.M.

***Life in the City of God: An Introduction to the Religious Life* by Rene Carpentier, S.J.; tr. John Joyce; Benziger Bros., 1959; 192 pp., $3.75**

In his introduction to religious life, Fr. Carpentier has given us a brief, meaningful, and valuable book, dealing with the full import of consecrated religious living, instead of an extended treatment of obligations imposed through the vows. An entirely recast edition of *The Catechism of the Vows, Life in the City of God* lays emphasis on a unified, organic view of religious life. This work is an attempt, and a highly successful one at that, towards a theology of religious life. A conceptual framework is erected in which religious life is shown to be more than a private encounter with God, but also as a life having great meaning even for those not in religious life. The interrelationship of the vows one to another, the value of the consecrated sacrifice of one's life, the social apostolate of religious life, are skillfully interwoven into the main theme that religious life is the life *par excellence*, the life of Christ. This book is a heartening exercise in interpretation, tieing together the manifold activity of a religious life and according it a profound significance.

The structure of the work is simple enough: Part I deals with the foundations of the City of God, the evangelical origin of religious life; Part II is an appreciation of religious life, highlight-

ing the value of consecrated living as a life of charity and adoration. It is not until Part III that we meet the obligations of religious life. The first two sections of the book are of particular value, so constructed that the third part, dealing with the obligations of vows, evolves from the very nature of the life so described. Thus Fr. Carpentier writes:

> In this book we lay special emphasis on the value of religion and adoration imparted by the vows to the *whole of life* under the influence of the love which appeals for the unreserved gift of self. Thus there is a shift in perspective. Grave obligations are not in any way diminished, but they are seen for what they are, namely, as the lowest limits which must not be transgressed. In this way it is easy to see that the vows operate not only when we are performing strictly obligatory acts, but above all in continuous fidelity, through love, to the consecration of our whole life (p. xiv).

Much of what Fr. Carpentier has to say will be familiar to readers, but familiar truths are stated with vigor and new approaches introduced with thoughtful insight. Still, this is an introduction, necessitating a rather brief treatment of some subjects. If the book has a failing, it seems to be a lack of visual coherency. Constant divisions, aggravated by a typographical gimmick to enable further reading, and repeated references in the body of the text to past or future sections, serve to distract the reader beyond necessity and interrupt the present thought. The value of the book, however, will repay putting up with these annoyances. Obviously, the book is of importance to spiritual directors and novice masters, and every member of religious life. Moreover, it should be placed in the hands of anyone about to enter or just newly entered upon religious life. If a young man or woman views his future life from within this framework, he will have gone a long way towards assuring a safe arrival in the City of God. All told, this is an excellent book, based on experience, thought, and current papal directives on religious life. It is sure to be read and re-read. And then read again.

VINCENT DEPAUL CUSHING, O.F.M.

***The Meaning of Love* by Robert Johann, S.J.; The Newman Press, 1959; 133 pp., $3.50**

The Meaning of Love was presented as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Louvain. It is an essay towards a metaphysics of intersubjectivity (subtitle). "Subjectivity" is a phenomenalogical notion which cannot, strictly, be defined. Neither, then, can it be questioned. It is either accepted or not. How describe it? "Subjectivity" is the existential conscious reality of "self" experiencing "self," not as *me*, but as uniquely *I*. "Intersubjectivity" involves a mysterious dialogue:

> The beloved is not present to the lover as an object, but precisely as a subject, a self in all the depths of his inner mystery . . . [This love] is really an extension of the inward presence of being to itself, and constitutes a sort of polarity, a face-to-faceness within being on the level of absolute value (p. 6).

Fr. Johann has chosen to speak of that *of which we cannot speak;* there is a kind of love which is "irrational."

> Why do I love you? Because you are—*you*. That is the best that it can do. It is indefensible. To the extent that it can list no reasons for its own existence, it is irrational. [On the other hand, there is a kind of love which is more reasonable.] When "I love you" equals "I want you," the expected satisfaction of the want is reason enough for the love . . . (p. 11).

The thesis is to guarantee the distinction between these two loves and to establish "subjectivity" on the only scientific philosophy which is constructed to support the weight—the metaphysics of *participation*.

To build upon the philosophy of St. Thomas, Fr. Johann first assays it for flaws. This analysis shows that St. Thomas' *ex professo* treatment of the good is inadequate. The good from the essentialist point of view must be that which is perfective. Fr. Johann maintains that the Angelic Doctor has failed to transcend Aristotle in this regard. Within this orientation, natural love must always be reduced to the *love of desire*. St. Thomas himself affirms that *direct love* is superior to love of desire, but he only substantiates this view where he treats of supernatural charity. The object of direct love is loved for itself as absolute, and Fr. Johann argues that "this distinct and more profound dynamism is not excluded from the order of nature" (p. 59).

St. Thomas does recognize that the good cannot be viewed *solely* from the point of view of act and potency, and he has "supplied us with principles by which to balance, complement and transcend this approach to being as essence" (p. 58). The Thomistic philosophy of being is not only true, but it alone can concretize what contemporary philosophers hint at. Love can unite me and God and my neighbor, not *despite* the fact that we are distinct, but precisely because of it.



Fr. Johann's task is necessarily very argumentative, but the intellectual exercise is punctuated by occasional moments of warmth, for example: "A face that comes into sight is a reality that surrenders itself . . ." (p. 37). The technical strength of Scholastic terminology has been transformed from the Latin into very readable English, (and the casual reader may often miss a point for this same reason).

Fr. Johann's primary assumption is that we cannot give a *why* for love itself. We cannot reason *to* love but we must, nevertheless, reason *about* it. His own logic must lead to the conclusion that love, as such, is beyond human comprehension. It seems to us that his real aim is to establish the mere *conditio qua non* for love, but the whole flavor of the work bespeaks the meaning of love itself. The reader will realize that this paradox is intrinsic to the subject matter; nevertheless, some clarification seems possible.

The final chapter presents a reconciliation, as it were, of direct love with the love of desire. The author establishes an integration which is logically appealing; however, it does not seem complete. Fr. Johann concludes that the ultimate perfection of the love of desire is to desire to give one's self. He rightly reorientates this self-centered function and puts it at the service of direct love, but the way he explains it implicitly destroys what he is here trying to preserve—the natural "selfishness" of the love of desire. We too believe that the natural is good, and we see no reason why the natural acquisitiveness of desire should be reduced in its perfection to the sole ambition of giving.

Understanding that the following example should be applied reciprocally, let us grant that some one has direct love for me. His own happiness is that I am happy (direct love). His happiness would then increase when he is able to grant my desires. If, then, I too loved him (direct love), would I love him less by manifesting my wants to him? The mutual happiness of such a union of direct love might well be frustrated by the purposeful effort *always* to be giving. We believe that the love of desire has a distinct and important role which Fr. Johann minimizes.

The value of Fr. Johann's essay will be in proportion to the interest and energy the reader brings to it. The first reading can be profitable. Subsequent readings can be wonderful, our criticism notwithstanding.

CELESTINE L. LEARY, O.F.M.

***The Mystery of the Church* by Yves Congar, O.P.; tr. A. V. Littledale; Helicon Press, 1960; 186 pp., $4.75**

The mounting interest in Church unity, as seen during the past few decades, has undoubtedly been one very strong factor in precipitating new studies in the field of ecclesiology. Recent publications of various scope and magnitude, varying anywhere from the pamphlet found in our church vestibules to Journet's *Church of the Word Incarnate*, are clear indications of this interest and quest for a deeper understanding of the Church in the Divine Plan. Fr. Congar's *Mystery of the Church* admirably stimulates this interest and knowledge by considering a very important aspect of Christ's Church—the role of the Holy Spirit.

This work is a compilation of various essays whose central theme is the mission of the Holy Spirit in the Church. The bridge between the first study, which

is mainly ascetical in nature, and the remaining doctrinal studies is somewhat artificial, but its value in enriching our appreciation of the mystery of the Church more than offsets any defect of change in style and logical connection. In the Preface the reader is met with the statement, "that the Church is to be fully understood only by being seen from within and ultimately only by those who live within it." Only thus is it possible to avoid the enigmas which naturally arise if the Church is viewed externally, and Fr. Congar ably assists the reader in this internal view. The work is primarily theological as opposed to apologetical and ascetical, although the latter two elements are far from being absent. The author supports his thesis on the firm foundation of Scripture and the Fathers and develops his theme by means of a "living and active tradition" and theological reasoning. One disconcerting note, however, is his frequent use of scriptural references without the accompanying text.

The student of fundamental theology will be especially interested in the author's second essay, "The Church and Its Unity." Although theological in approach, its apologetical value is not absent. This chapter is further enhanced by the gradual but masterful presentation and development of the vivifying force which characterizes the Church. Thus, the natural pitfall of all beginning students, of viewing the Church as "another" society but with added embellishments, is avoided. "All its exterior life, all its social ordering, are but an expression and an instrument of an interior life which is the life of Christ" (p. 96).

The treatment of St. Thomas' ecclesiology, although not complete, is a necessary preparation for understanding the role of the Holy Spirit. The author introduces the anthropological, theocentric, and christological elements of the Church, as well as a penetrating discussion of the binding force of these elements with the external aspects.

> This intimate fusion of the inward unity and the elements of the outward unity seems to be manifested in St. Thomas through two chief ideas: (1) the Church-as-Institution is the very mode of being of the Mystical Body and of the new life in Christ; (2) she is the Sacrament of the ministry, that is, the instrument of realization of the Mystical Body (p. 110).

The author clearly brings out the harmony between the thought of St. Thomas and the Fathers, which in summary is best expressed in his own words:

> That tradition can be characterized by three marks; The Church is contemplated as a Spirit-moved, Spirit-known and Spirit-defined reality, as the Body whose living soul is the Spirit of Life. The Church is contemplated in Christ, as Christ is contemplated in the Church. And the inward Church is not separated from the outward Church, which is the Sacramental veil and vehicle (p. 117).

In the fifth chapter Fr. Congar departs from his main theme of the mission of the Holy Spirit in order to show what is meant by a "living and active" tradition. The author's analysis of the Epistles and the Acts in regard to the Church's awareness of its catholicity illustrates the point in question. The universal call of all men to salvation was not immediately evident to either St. Peter or St. Paul. For the "Apostle," the awareness slowly came to him by force of circumstances—hostility of the Jews and a vision. St. Peter answered the objections of the Jewish converts by the principle fact that the pagans of Cornelius' household had received the Holy Spirit. Their appeal was not to texts, but the text's full meaning came to light in the face of the facts.

> When Peter appealed to what the Lord had said (xi:16) it was precisely to indicate that it was then that he recalled it. We might almost say that it was then he understood what it meant, which would not be far from the truth, for in the course of gradual discovery of its own interior law that the Church makes by living it, it is always the facts and the process of living that brings a subsequent understanding of the real significance and scope of previous experiences (p. 142).

The final study entitled, "The Holy Spirit and the Apostolic Body, Continuators of the Work of Christ," brings into bold relief the workings of the Holy Spirit in conjunction with the apostles, but at the same time, it emphasizes His autonomy. Tradition has spoken of the Holy Spirit as being the Soul of the Church, and the author examines the sense in which this is to be understood by first discarding any misconceptions that might have arisen from the previous treatment of His workings. The union is not incarnational, nor is it to be understood as that which exists between the soul and body in man, but rather it is a union of alliance resting on God's promise.

The purpose of the "duality of agents" is to bring to fulfillment what Christ established. The prolongation of Christ's work by the external ministry is efficaciously directed and consecrated through the ministry of the Holy Spirit. However, the mission of Christ and the mission of the Holy Spirit, although similar in certain aspects, are not to be confused.

> . . . the mission of the Incarnate Word gives each individual soul, as it gave to the Church, existence in the new order of creation; it set up the structure of the Church and established an objective salvation with the various sources of grace and truth. The mission of the Holy Spirit makes these all produce their effects, gives the body of the Church its soul and brings the saving gifts to their fulfillment. Consequently, while acting always in accordance with the unique and decisive event of the Incarnation in time and "bringing to mind" what Christ said (John xiv:26), the Holy Spirit continues to guide into all truth and to make plain what is still to come (John xiv:13) (p. 151).

Another significant aspect of the ministry of the Holy Spirit is His autonomy as manifested by charismata and "sudden visitations." In regard to the latter, we need only consider St. Peter and Cornelius, Philip and the eunuch, as the author demonstrates, to realize the value of this element in building up the body of Christ.

> How often . . . in the history of the Church, important decisions about vocations, foundations, even canons of Councils, have been taken as a result of a dream, a word, a consultation of Scripture . . . (p. 179).

The lives of the saints (e.g., St. Francis and his rule) give witness to this most valuable and not at all rare element in the life of the Church. This free and personal action of the "Lord of the Apostolate" clearly illustrates His "sovereign liberty" in the internal ministry.

A better appreciation and understanding of the interior ministry of the Holy Spirit in Christ's Church by those engaged in the apostolate is certainly most desirable. Fr. Congar's *Mystery of the Church*, is a felicitious selection by any priest or student of theology in deepening and strengthening his love of Christ's Spouse.

TIMOTHY F. GRITMON, O.F.M.